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ATLAS NODS:
THE LIBERTARIAN CASE FOR A BASIC INCOME
MIRANDA PERRY FLEISCHER *
DANIEL HEMEL**
Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across
the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California,
Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most
outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described
libertarians—even though libertarians are generally considered to be
antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its
core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong
libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals?
This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic
safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several (though
not all) strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians
committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a
system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits
in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all
citizens—even poor ones—are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling
such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks
the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable
individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-ina-lifetime lump-sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a
minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also
allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market
transactions.
Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian
theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices
inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large
should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as
market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic
income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case
for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky:
libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic
income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both
aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our
analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or
skeptical of basic income arguments.
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INTRODUCTION
Proposals for a universal basic income (UBI) are generating
interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the
works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda.1
Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a UBI have
been self-described libertarians. Nobel laureate economist and
libertarian icon Milton Friedman supported a UBI as part of his
“negative income tax” proposal.2 More recently, eBay co-founder
Pierre Omidiyar3 and prominent public intellectual Charles Murray4—
both of whom identify with libertarianism—have come out in favor of a
UBI. The Libertarian Party’s standard bearer in the last two
presidential elections, Gary Johnson, has said he is “open” to the idea
of a UBI,5 and his tax plan during both campaigns incorporated

1.
2.

See infra notes 33–41 and accompanying text.
Noah Gordon, The Conservative Case for a Guaranteed Basic Income,
ATLANTIC (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/whyarent-reformicons-pushing-a-guaranteed-basic-income/375600/ [https://perma.cc/R9LZSMDQ].
3.
On Omidiyar’s libertarianism, see ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE:
INSIDE EBAY 7, 16, 27, 90 (2002).
4.
CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE
STATE (rev. and updated ed. 2016). Murray’s case for a UBI is intelligent and
important—worthy of careful consideration and critique. This Article provides one such
critique. We ultimately conclude that Murray undersells the libertarian argument for a
UBI as a first-best and overstates the libertarian argument for a UBI as a second-best.
Unfortunately, others have refused to engage with Murray’s arguments except through
violence. See Laura Krantz, ‘Bell Curve’ Author Attacked by Protesters at Middlebury
College,
BOS.
GLOBE
(Mar.
5,
2017),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/03/04/middlebury/hAfpA1Hquh7DIS1doiKb
hJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/W8TQ-QZ7Y?type=image].
5.
Brett Linley, Gary Johnson Is Open to Universal Basic Income and That’s
Not
Bad,
LIBERTARIAN
REPUBLIC
(July
20,
2016),
http://thelibertarianrepublic.com/gary-johnson-is-open-to-universal-basic-income
[https://perma.cc/V3CV-XM9U].
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elements of a UBI.6 Indeed, support for a UBI today may well be
stronger on the libertarian right than on the progressive left.7
What makes libertarian support for a UBI so surprising is that a
UBI is, at its core, a program of income redistribution.8 Under a UBI,
6.
See Christopher E. Baecker, The ‘Fair Tax’ Fairly Understood, SAN
ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS
(Sept.
17,
2016),
http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/article/The-fair-tax-fairlyunderstood-9228383.php [https://perma.cc/DDN9-ULTK]. Johnson’s plan provided for
a twenty-eight percent sales tax (thirty-nine percent if calculated on a tax-exclusive
base), coupled with a “prebate” check to ensure that households below the poverty line
end up with no net tax liability. The prebate would have been approximately $12,000
per adult and $4,000 per child, and would have operated like a basic income of that
amount. See id.
7.
For progressive critiques of the UBI, see Joel Dodge, The Progressive
Case Against a Universal Basic Income, QUARTZ (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://qz.com/789889/a-universal-basic-income-could-wind-up-hurting-the-poor-andhelping-the-rich [https://perma.cc/T2HU-RQYJ]; Robert Greenstein, Commentary:
Universal Basic Income May Sound Attractive But, If It Occurred, Would Likelier
Increase Poverty Than Reduce It, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (May 31,
2016),
http://www.cbpp.org/poverty-and-opportunity/commentary-universal-basicincome-may-sound-attractive-but-if-it-occurred
[https://perma.cc/BHT7-6GGL];
Vicente Navarro, Why the Universal Basic Income Is Not the Best Public Intervention
to Reduce Poverty or Income Inequality, SOCIAL EUR. (May 24, 2016),
https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/05/why-the-universal-basic-income-is-not-the-bestpublic-intervention-to-reduce-poverty-or-income-inequality
[https://perma.cc/H6MPZZA8?type=image]; Max Sawicky, Guest Post: Max Sawicky on the Liberal Case
Against a Universal Basic Income, ROOSEVELT INST. (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://rooseveltinstitute.org/guest-post-max-sawicky-liberal-case-against-universalbasic-income [https://perma.cc/4PQS-RNQP].
8.
In this Article, we address only the “right” libertarian theories of minimal
state libertarianism and classical liberalism, theories to which most people who selfidentify as libertarians subscribe. We do not address “left” libertarian theories of justice
here. Although both assume an initial right of self-ownership, right and left libertarian
theories diverge as to the initial ownership of natural resources. Right-libertarian
theories assume that such resources are initially un-owned, while left-libertarian
theories assume that such resources are initially jointly owned. As a result, leftlibertarians justify redistributive taxation in order to compensate non-appropriators for
their lost rights to resources appropriated by others, although debate exists as to how
much compensation is owed. Because left-libertarians generally agree that redistribution
is justified, we do not rehash those arguments here and instead focus on rightlibertarianism, which is generally thought to be hostile to redistribution. Although
“right-libertarianism” overlaps with “right” political doctrines on many economic
matters (for example, opposition to most governmental economic regulation), the two
often differ when it comes to social policies. “Right-libertarians,” for example,
generally support drug legalization, equal rights regardless of sexual orientation, and
abortion rights while opposing the death penalty and prayer in schools. Some suggest
that a better term is “market” libertarians. See, e.g., Matt Zwolinski, Classical
Liberalism and the Basic Income, 6 BASIC INCOME STUD. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Zwolinski, Basic Income]. For useful overviews of left-libertarianism generally see
Peter Vallentyne, Left-Libertarianism and Liberty, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 136, 138–44 (Thomas Christiano & John Christman eds., 2009)
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each member of society receives a guaranteed payment from the
government on a periodic basis—perhaps $10,000 a year, though
potentially less or more. That money has to come from somewhere, and
that “somewhere” is taxation. Moreover, the tax-and-transfer scheme
inherent in a UBI is necessarily redistributive: some (presumably
wealthier) taxpayers pay more than $10,000 a year to fund the UBI and
other (presumably poorer) taxpayers pay less than $10,000 a year. If
everyone paid $10,000 a year to fund a UBI, then the transfer would be
circular and the program would accomplish nothing. Yet libertarianism
is—or at least is generally thought to be—inhospitable to redistribution.
What explains the libertarian support for a policy that seems so
contrary to libertarian ideals?
This Article sets out to answer that question. In doing so, we aim
to expand the legal literature’s understanding of libertarian theory.
Although legal academics most often associate libertarianism with
Robert Nozick’s assertion that “taxation is on par with forced labor,” a
closer look at libertarian ideals reveals that limited redistributive taxand-transfer schemes can be justified on a number of libertarian
grounds.9 We argue that the conversation within libertarianism about
redistribution can yield insights useful to libertarians and nonlibertarians alike. Part of our objective in this Article is thus to draw
connections that bridge the libertarian/non-libertarian divide. (Indeed,
this Article is itself a product of a collaboration between one author
with libertarian sympathies and another who is an avowed nonlibertarian.)10
Moreover, by evaluating a UBI on libertarian grounds while
writing for an audience of both libertarians and non-libertarians, we
respond to a demand from non-libertarian UBI supporters for a fuller
understanding of the libertarian basis for a UBI. Currently, many nonlibertarian supporters of a UBI are hesitant to ally with their libertarian
fellow travelers. They fear that a UBI could be a “Trojan horse”
and MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY 11–22 (2003). For a leftlibertarian argument in favor of a basic income, see PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL
FREEDOM FOR ALL (1995).
9.
See, e.g., OTSUKA, supra note 8, at 16.
10.
We should be clear that we are making a libertarian case for a universal
basic income and not a case for libertarianism. One can agree with our claim that “a
UBI is consistent with libertarian first principles” while endorsing or not endorsing
those first principles. Thus, our project is distinct from the left-libertarian enterprise,
which explicitly concedes the premise of self-ownership and then seeks to justify
redistribution from there. Cf. Barbara H. Fried, Left-Libertarianism: A Review Essay,
32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 66, 92 (2004) (“[L]eft-libertarians may hope that, by coopting
self-ownership to egalitarian ends, they can reclaim the moral high ground from rightlibertarians. But in conceding that the libertarian notion of self-ownership is the moral
high ground to begin with, they may well give up more than they bargain for. . . .”).
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offered by libertarians and capitalists seeking ultimately to dismantle
the welfare state.11 Here, we look inside the horse to see whether it is
indeed hollow, and conclude that it is not. Libertarianism offers
normative support for pursuing a UBI as a permanent policy objective.
Of course, whether or not we think a UBI is consistent with libertarian
principles does not reveal the motives of other UBI supporters. We do
think, though, that our examination of the libertarian bases for a UBI
will help non-libertarians evaluate the sincerity of their potential
coalition partners, and will give them greater confidence that committed
libertarians can support a UBI as an end in itself rather than a mere
waystation on the road toward the evisceration of the welfare state.
We begin by considering whether some amount of redistribution
can be reconciled with libertarianism. We believe that the answer is
yes: a basic safety net is consistent with several (though not all) strands
of minimal state libertarianism and classical liberalism. As our title
suggests, the libertarian Atlas should not shrug at the sight of poverty;
we explain why individuals committed to libertarian first principles
ought to care about providing a minimum level of material well-being
for all.12 We then explain why libertarians committed to limited
redistribution and limited government might support a system of
transfers that come in cash rather than in-kind. As compared to
redistribution in-kind, cash transfers further individual autonomy by
recognizing that all citizens—even poor ones—are the best judges of
their needs. Next, we consider whether, from a libertarian perspective,
11.
See, e.g., Evgeny Morozov, Silicon Valley Talks a Good Game on ‘Basic
Income’, But Its Words Are Empty, GUARDIAN (Feb. 27, 2016 19:05 EST),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/feb/28/silicon-valley-basic-income;
Bernardo Sousa-Pinto, Letter, Universal Basic Income May Be a Trojan Horse, 356
BMJ 190 (2017).
12.
Cf. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957). We note that Rand’s title is not
used to describe indifference toward the plight of the poor specifically. Rather, it refers
to the following exchange between the characters Francisco d’Anconia and Hank
Rearden:
D’ANCONIA: “[I]f you saw Atlas, the giant who holds the world
on his shoulders, if you saw that he stood, blood running down his chest,
his knees buckling, his arms trembling but still trying to hold the world
aloft with the last of his strength, and the greater his effort the heavier the
world bore down on his shoulders—what would you tell him to do?”
REARDEN: “I . . . don’t know. What . . . could he do? What
would you tell him?”
D’ANCONIA: “To shrug.”
Id. at 455. We also note that many libertarians consider Rand to be a caricature rather
than a standard-bearer of libertarian thought. See, e.g., Jason Brennan, Why Talk About
“Cartoon Libertarianism”?, BLEEDING HEART LIBERTARIANS (May 8, 2013),
http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2013/05/why-talk-about-cartoon-libertarianism
[https://perma.cc/8QPR-6NST].
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a system of cash transfers should be universal or conditional. On this
point, we diverge from other libertarian writers who have argued for
coupling cash transfers with a work requirement. We show that the
minimal state libertarian argument for cash transfers plus a work
requirement rests on the premise that the state can distinguish between
work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Libertarians, who are
generally skeptical of state capacity, will almost certainly reject that
premise and so should reject a work requirement as well. We then
evaluate whether universal cash transfers should occur through periodic
payments or through a once-in-a-lifetime lump-sum grant. We present a
novel argument as to why libertarians should prefer the former to the
latter. Lump sum grants, we explain, will either be over-compensatory
with respect to the short-lived or under-compensatory with respect to
the long-lived. While luck egalitarians might conclude that
overcompensation for the short-lived is desirable, libertarians—we
argue—will not.
Although our main goal is to assess the fit between libertarian
theory and a UBI, we would be remiss if we did not address various
design choices policymakers will face in implementing a UBI: Should it
be limited to adults? Citizens? Should it be phased-out with income?
How large should it be, and what programs would it replace? Here, we
show how various strains of libertarian theory might shed light on these
design decisions. Lastly, we consider the political economy of a UBI
from two directions. We discuss the ways that the political economy of
redistribution affects the prospects for a UBI and the ways in which a
UBI might affect the political economy of redistribution. Somewhat
surprisingly, our analysis challenges the arguments of those libertarians
who are opposed to any government redistribution but grudgingly
accept a UBI on second-best grounds. Libertarians who reject our
argument that a UBI is first-best should, we think, be skeptical of the
second-best case for a UBI as well.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief
overview of the UBI, its historical roots, and current UBI experiments.
Part II considers whether libertarianism is consistent with some amount
of redistribution. Part III then asks whether the libertarian case for
limited redistribution translates into a case for unconditional cash
transfers paid out periodically. Part IV explores design choices and
assesses how the theoretical justification for a UBI influences those
choices. Part V examines the political economy surrounding a UBI.
Part VI concludes.
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I. HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW

Proposals for a universal basic income—sometimes known as a
basic income guarantee—call for the government to ensure that all
citizens (or, in some versions, all adult citizens, or all citizens and noncitizen residents) receive a minimum income on a periodic basis (e.g.,
monthly, quarterly, or annually). Such a minimum income would be
paid in “cash” rather than in-kind (though we put “cash” in quotation
marks because a UBI could be paid out through checks, debit cards,
direct deposit arrangements, or digital currency13 rather than in physical
bills). It would not be dependent on whether the recipient holds a job—
and is in this sense distinct from the earned income tax credit, which
provides benefits only to wage-earners. Nor would it be dependent on
whether the recipient participates in job training or otherwise seeks
employment.
A. A Brief History
The concept of a guaranteed income has deep historical roots. In
fact, Thomas Paine championed one variation—an unconditional oncein-a-lifetime grant—over 200 years ago.14 Paine proposed the creation
of a “national fund, out of which there shall be paid to every person,
when arrived at the age of twenty-one years, the sum of fifteen pounds
sterling, as a compensation in part, for the loss of his or her natural
inheritance, by the introduction of the system of landed property.”15 In
the century and a half after Paine, a variety of thinkers and
policymakers—including British economist and philosopher Bertrand
Russell and Louisiana politician Huey Long—also expressed support for
programs of universal cash grants.16
Milton Friedman’s 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom drew
further attention to the UBI idea.17 More specifically, Friedman
proposed a “negative income tax” (NIT) that would replace existing
welfare programs. Friedman and his coauthor (and spouse) Rose
Friedman later described their NIT proposal as follows:
13.
See Dom Galeon & Abby Norman, Universal Basic Income Could Become
a Reality, Thanks to This Technology, FUTURISM (Mar. 10, 2017),
https://futurism.com/1-evergreen-the-best-currency-for-a-universal-basic-income-couldbe-digital (discussing UBI experiments that rely on blockchain-based payments).
14.
THOMAS PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE (1797).
15.
Id. at 15–16.
16.
See ALLAN SHEAHEN, BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE 173 (2012).
17.
David E. Thigpen, Universal Basic Income: What Is It, and Is It Right for
the U.S.?, ROOSEVELT INST. (Oct. 2016), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/universal-basicincome-what-it-and-it-right-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/U5LM-P2D8].
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The basic idea of a negative income tax is simple . . . . Under
the current positive income tax you are permitted to receive a
certain amount of income without paying any tax. . . . This
amount is composed of a number of elements—personal
exemptions . . . standard deduction . . . [etc.]. To simplify
the discussion, let us use the simpler British term of “personal
allowances” to refer to this basic amount.
If your income exceeds your allowances, you pay a tax on the
excess at rates that are graduated according to the size of the
excess. Suppose your income is less than the allowances?
Under the current system, those unused allowances in general
are of no value. You simply pay no tax. . . .
With a negative income tax, you would receive from the
government some fraction of the unused allowances. . . .
When your income was above allowances, you would pay tax,
the amount depending on the tax rates charged on various
amounts of income. When your income was below
allowances, you would receive a subsidy, the amount
depending on the subsidy rates attributed to various amounts
of unused allowances.18
Under an NIT, any individual whose taxable income is below the
allowance amount receives a subsidy back from the government in the
amount of the subsidy rate multiplied by their unused allowance. To
illustrate, assume that the non-taxable allowance is $10,000 and that the
subsidy and tax rates are fifty percent. Under an NIT, Adam, with
income of zero, receives a subsidy of $5,000 (50% of his unused
allowance of $10,000). Bonnie, with income of $10,000, neither
receives a subsidy nor pays tax. Christine, with income of $50,000,
pays tax of $20,000 (50% of the $40,000 excess over her allowance).
The NIT example in the previous paragraph is economically
equivalent to a UBI coupled with a tax on all non-UBI income. Now
assume that each of Adam, Bonnie, and Christine receive a UBI of
$5,000 but that all non-UBI income is taxed at fifty percent. Adam
receives a UBI of $5,000 and pays no tax. Bonnie receives a UBI of
$5,000 but pays tax of $5,000 (50% of $10,000), so the net transfer
between Bonnie and the government is zero. Christine receives a UBI
of $5,000 but pays tax of $25,000 (50% of $50,000), giving her a net
tax bill of $20,000. Economically, all three taxpayers are in the same
position under both a UBI and an NIT, although the optics of the two
systems differ.
18.
MILTON & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT
120–21 (1980).
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The concept of an NIT attracted the support of numerous
economists as well as widespread attention from policymakers, leading
to its inclusion in President Nixon’s 1969 Family Assistance Plan
(FAP).19 Written by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the FAP proposed to
replace the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
with something approximating an NIT.20 The FAP differed from a true
NIT (and thus from a true UBI) in two important respects: first, the
FAP was limited to families with children; second, the FAP required
that recipients either be employed or be seeking employment.21 Yet
despite these important differences, advocates for the FAP mustered
many of the same arguments as modern-day UBI supporters, and the
push for the FAP in the late 1960s can be considered a precursor to the
twenty-first century UBI movement.22
Nixon unveiled the plan in a televised address in August 1969, and
the concept initially enjoyed broad public and Congressional support.23
Democratic Representative Wilbur Mills of Arkansas, then the chair of
the House Ways and Means Committee, and his Wisconsin Republican
colleague John Byrnes soon translated the FAP into H.R. 16311, which
sailed through the House Ways and Means Committee by a vote of 213.24 The bill also easily passed the full House by a margin of 243-155,
with roughly sixty percent of each party’s members voting for it.25
Soon, however, a coalition of liberals (who thought the FAP was too
stingy) and conservatives (who believed that it would discourage work)
joined forces against the bill.26 After months of debate, the Senate
Finance Committee killed H.R. 16311 in November of 1970, largely
due to the opposition of chair Russell Long, a Democratic Senator from
Louisiana (and, ironically, the son of UBI supporter Huey Long).27 The
FAP reappeared during the next Congress, and again passed the House

19.
Thigpen, supra note 17.
20.
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The
Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1969–99, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 983, 988
(2000).
21.
Mark L. Wolf & John V. Erickson, Work Incentive Aspects of the Family
Assistance Plan, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 179 n.2 (1971).
22.
Ventry, supra note 20.
23.
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 3 (1973);
Ventry, supra note 20, at 989.
24.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 3; Ventry, supra note 23, at 989 n.21.
25.
MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 437–38.
26.
Ventry, supra note 23, at 989.
27.
Id. at 990–92; MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 533. On Huey Long’s
support for a UBI, see Share Our Wealth, LONG LEGACY PROJECT,
http://www.hueylong.com/programs/share-our-wealth.php
[https://perma.cc/6SVDFKN4].
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but not the Senate.28 Democratic presidential candidate George
McGovern made it part of his platform during the 1972 election, but
after his defeat and Nixon’s impeachment and resignation, political
interest in the FAP withered.29
The push for the FAP was not a failure entirely. The proposal laid
the groundwork for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which
continues to this day.30 But while the FAP would have boosted families
whose breadwinners were out of work, the EITC—as the name
implies—only flows to workers who are earning wages, salaries, tips,
other employee compensation, or income from self-employment.31
B. Current UBI Programs
After lying largely dormant for over forty years, the UBI is once
again generating widespread interest.32 While no country has yet
implemented a broad-based UBI, several pilot schemes are underway or
in the works. These include:
— A randomized controlled trial in two U.S. states launched by
the Silicon Valley startup accelerator Y Combinator in January 2017,
that will provide around $1,000 per month to 1,000 families for five
years;33
— A program in Ontario, Canada, run by the provincial
government, that will provide a UBI of 16,989 Canadian dollars, or
roughly $13,470, to a group of around 2,000 recipients, with the
benefit phasing out at a fifty percent rate (i.e., each additional $1 of
market income reduces the size of an individual’s UBI by $0.50);34
28.
29.

MOYNIHAN, supra note 23, at 441.
See ANDY STERN WITH LEE KRAVITZ, RAISING THE FLOOR: HOW A
UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME CAN RENEW OUR ECONOMY AND REBUILD THE AMERICAN
DREAM 176 (2016).
30.
See Ventry, supra note 23.
31.
See 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2) (2012).
32.
Some of this interest has been motivated by concerns about automation
and artificial intelligence leading to widespread unemployment. We are skeptical that a
UBI can be justified on those grounds, for reasons that one of us has explained
elsewhere. See Daniel Hemel, Bringing the Basic Income Back to Earth, NEW
RAMBLER
REV.
(Sept.
19,
2016),
http://newramblerreview.com/bookreviews/economics/bringing-the-basic-income-back-to-earth
[https://perma.cc/7E8P8GZ8] (reviewing MURRAY, supra note 4, and STERN WITH KRAVITZ, supra note 29).
33.
Elizabeth Rhodes, Basic Income Research Proposal, Y COMBINATOR RES.
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://basicincome.ycr.org/blog/2017/8/24/basic-income-researchproposal. Other families will receive $50 per month, providing the control group.
34.
Rachelle Younglai, Ontario to Roll out Basic Income in Three Cities,
GLOBE
&
MAIL
(Apr.
24,
2017),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/what-is-basic-income-and-whoqualifies/article34795127 [https://perma.cc/E4CJ-YENH].
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— An experiment, launched by Finland’s national government in
January 2017, that will give 560 euros (approximately $660), no strings
attached, to 2,000 unemployed citizens for two years;35
— A trial in the Italian city of Livorno that provided 100 families
with an income of 517 euros per month (roughly $537) from June to
December 2016, with the program doubling its number of participants
in 2017;36
— A program in rural Kenya run by the nonprofit GiveDirectly
that will involve cash transfers to more than 26,000 people;37 and
— A pilot in Uganda run by a Belgian charity that provides $18.25
per month to fifty-six adults and $9.13 to eighty-eight children.38
While we are optimistic that these UBI demonstration projects can
generate useful data regarding the welfare effects of a minimum
income, these projects will not “prove” the case for a UBI. First, not
all arguments for a UBI are welfarist: as we discuss below, libertarians
may embrace a UBI on the grounds that it strengthens private property
rights and enhances individual autonomy, freedom, and dignity. These
values may be (and we think are) worth pursuing regardless of whether
a UBI is less costly than the current system of redistributive transfers,
whether it increases labor force participation, or whether it improves
measurable outcomes related to health, education, or welfare.
Moreover, although these experiments may shed some light on
whether a UBI distorts individual choices more or less than other
redistributive schemes, these experiments cannot provide a complete
picture. One limitation is the very nature of experiments, which are
time-limited and small-scale. An individual may well react differently
to an experimental UBI that she will receive for a year or two than to a
UBI guaranteed for her whole life, because the latter gives her a longer
time horizon with which to plan. Similarly, experiments that enroll only
35.
See The Ministry of Social Affairs Requests Opinions on a Basic Income
Experiment, MINISTRY SOC. AFF. & HEALTH FINL. (Aug. 25, 2016, 16:02),
http://stm.fi/artikkeli/-/asset_publisher/sosiaali-ja-terveysministerio-pyytaa-lausuntojaosittaisen-perustulokokeiluntoteuttamisesta?_101_INSTANCE_yr7QpNmlJmSj_languageId=en
[https://perma.cc/TYD7-N5Z8].
36.
Andrew Kaplan, Italy: Basic Income Pilot Launched in Italian Coastal
City,
BASIC
INCOME
EARTH
NETWORK
(Dec.
28,
2016),
http://basicincome.org/news/2016/12/italy-basic-income-pilot-launched-italian-coastalcity [https://perma.cc/7CNW-GNN2].
37.
Launch
a
Basic
Income,
GIVEDIRECTLY,
https://www.givedirectly.org/basic-income [https://perma.cc/5XUN-UEME].
38.
See EIGHT VZW, http://eight.world [https://perma.cc/7MTJ-KZDR]; Kate
McFarland, Uganda: New Two-Year Basic Income Pilot Project, BASIC INCOME EARTH
NETWORK (Apr. 20, 2016), http://basicincome.org/news/2016/04/uganda-new-twoyear-basic-income-pilot-project [https://perma.cc/YG85-HE4D].
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a subset of the population do not tell us much about the impact of a
society-wide UBI. For example, past UBI experiments suggest that in
recipient families, teenagers delay full-time entry into the labor force
and instead stay in school longer.39 It might be the case that with a
society-wide UBI, such effects would be even more pronounced as
more and more of one’s friends and peers opt to stay in school. Or it
may be that a society-wide UBI interacts with wage rates so as to
moderate the labor supply effects observed in experiments.
A further limitation stems from the fact that the experiments
measure the impact on participants but not on the rest of society.
Consider the UBI’s potential impact on workforce participation. This
question will be examined by the Finnish experiment, which will
randomly assign some adults currently receiving unemployment benefits
to a treatment group that will instead receive a basic income of 560
euros a month. That amount corresponds to the allowance under the
existing unemployment scheme, but unlike existing unemployment
benefits, the basic income will continue even after the recipient is
reemployed. The Finnish experiment will compare employment
outcomes for subjects in the treatment group with outcomes for subjects
in a control group, which will continue to be governed by the status
quo.40
What will the Finnish experiment show? Let’s say that subjects in
the treatment group turn out to be more likely to resume work than
subjects in the control group. Indeed, it would be surprising if this were
not the result. In Finland, as in most countries, the existing
unemployment scheme imposes a very high marginal tax rate on
recipients who return to work. Most UBIs are structured such that
implicit marginal income tax rates never approach the levels
encountered by some low-income households under current law. But
would the fact that UBI recipients are more likely to resume work than
unemployed individuals in the control group “prove” the case for a UBI
according to a welfarist perspective? Not necessarily. Providing all
adults with a basic income of 560 euros a month is more expensive than
providing only unemployed adults with a basic income of 560 euros a
month. To pay for a UBI, Finland would have to raise taxes, which
may have its own negative effect on labor supply. The Finnish
experiment seeks to measure the UBI’s impact on labor participation by
recipients but not the effect of increased taxes on others.
39.
Evelyn Forget, The Town with No Poverty: The Health Effects of a
Canadian Guaranteed Annual Income Field Experiment, 37 CAN. PUB. POL. 283, 286
(2011).
40.
See The Ministry of Social Affairs Requests Opinions on a Basic Income
Experiment, supra note 35.
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Consider next the question of whether a UBI increases recipients’
“happiness, well-being, and financial health,” which the Y Combinator
experiment in Oakland seeks to study.41 It would be surprising if lowincome individuals randomly selected to receive a basic income aren’t
happy about the extra money. Proving that point, however, does not
establish that a UBI raises overall happiness more than an equally
expensive scheme of conditional transfers.
To illustrate, consider three individuals: Lazy, who is an
inframarginal non-worker; Grind, who is an inframarginal worker; and
Fence-Sitter, whose decision whether to work is dependent on the
effective tax rate. Let’s also imagine two possible policies: a UBI,
which provides unconditional benefits, and a wage subsidy that goes
only to workers. For the same total cost of $300, the government can
provide a UBI of $100 to Lazy, Grind, and Fence-Sitter, or a wage
subsidy of $150 that goes only to Grind and Fence-Sitter.
The Y Combinator study might be able to show whether Lazy,
Grind, and Fence-Sitter are better off with a UBI than with no cash
transfer (we assume they would be). But what about a UBI versus a
wage subsidy? Almost undoubtedly, Lazy is better off with the $100
UBI (versus nothing under a wage subsidy) and Grind is better off with
the $150 wage subsidy (versus a $100 UBI). But what about FenceSitter? His income is certainly higher with a wage subsidy, but income
is not the same as welfare. Fence-Sitter might well prefer not to work
and to receive a $100 UBI rather than working and receiving a $150
wage subsidy. Perhaps we could run a randomized trial in which some
individuals are offered a UBI, others are offered a wage subsidy, and
members of both groups self-report their own happiness at various
points along the way. But even assuming that we trust the accuracy of
self-reported happiness, we are still left with the challenge of
interpersonal utility comparisons. Recall that Lazy is unambiguously
better off with a UBI and Grind is unambiguously better off with a
wage subsidy: how do we weigh Lazy’s welfare against Grind’s?
Again, the answer is nonobvious. What does seem apparent is that the
answer is not one that a randomized controlled trial will easily uncover.
Moving beyond empirics, however, we again emphasize that the
libertarian case for a UBI does not depend on whether a UBI increases
well-being (or utility, or welfare) more than other redistributive
policies. Libertarianism is not utilitarianism: in the minds of (most)
libertarians, the fact that a policy increases overall welfare according to
some metric is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
41.
Sam Altman, Moving Forward on Basic Income, Y COMBINATOR
POSTHAVEN (May 31, 2016), https://blog.ycombinator.com/moving-forward-on-basicincome [https://perma.cc/ZB6M-JS8R].
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support.42 Our goal here is to assess whether redistribution in the form
of a UBI is consistent with libertarian principles. It is to that question
that we presently turn.
II. LIBERTARIANISM AND REDISTRIBUTIVE TRANSFERS
Although a number of theories of distributive justice—including
resource egalitarianism and utilitarianism—could support an argument
for a basic income, our Article is grounded in libertarian ideals. This
may seem like a surprising choice to readers who associate
libertarianism with Robert Nozick’s assertions that only “a minimal
state . . . is justified”43 and that “[t]axation . . . is on par with forced
labor.”44 This view (“minimal state libertarianism”), however, is but
one of several that can be classified as libertarian. What binds these
theories together is a celebration of the individual’s right to be free
from coercion, a strong respect for private property rights, a belief in
the general superiority of the free market, and a presumption that the
market’s results should generally remain undisturbed.45
These theories differ, however, in their conclusions as to whether
any state is justified, and if so, its proper contours. On one end of the
spectrum is “anarcho-capitalism.” This theory holds that there is no
justification for any state at all, and that voluntary associations can

42.
We note that some libertarians and classical liberals—such as Richard
Epstein—employ a utilitarian framework in justifying libertarianism and/or classical
liberalism as being the social and economic system that maximizes social utility. Here,
however, we use the phrase “utilitarianism” (alternatively, “welfarism”) to refer to
non-libertarian, non-classical liberal theories of justice, under which an expansive state
with substantial redistribution can be justified based on diminishing marginal utility of
income. On the relationship between diminishing marginal utility of income and
welfarist arguments for redistribution, see generally Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge:
Declining Marginal Utility of Income and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011).
43.
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE & UTOPIA ix (1974).
44.
Id. at 169.
45.
For overviews of libertarian thought see, HARRY BRIGHOUSE, JUSTICE 86–
94 (2004); WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN
INTRODUCTION 102–65 (2d ed. 2002); Eric Mack & Gerald F. Gaus, Classical
Liberalism and Libertarianism: The Liberty Tradition, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
THEORY 115, 124–29 (Gerald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004); Zwolinski,
supra note 8; Peter Vallentyne & Bas van der Vossen, Libertarianism, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2014/entries/libertarianism
[https://web.archive.org/web/20131202062108/http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2
013/entries/egalitarianism/]; Matt Zwolinski, Libertarianism, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY, http://www.iep.utm.edu/libertar [https://perma.cc/VRG4-9NTJ]; JOHN
TOMASI & MATT ZWOLINSKI, A BRIEF HISTORY OF LIBERTARIANISM (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript on file with author).
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adequately protect life and property.46 Next along the spectrum is
minimal state libertarianism, which, as the name implies, tolerates only
an extremely limited state. Third is “classical liberalism,” which sees
some role for government in providing a very limited number of public
goods and a minimal safety net to the poor. Classical liberalism,
however, contemplates a much narrower role for the state than under
the status quo and rejects the large-scale redistributive measures
favored by utilitarians and resource egalitarians as well as many current
government programs that do not meet strict definitions of public
goods.47 At the far end of the spectrum is left-libertarianism, which
countenances a considerable amount of redistribution based on the
premise that natural resources are initially commonly-owned, as
opposed to un-owned.48 As we noted above,49 our focus here is on right
libertarian theories that are generally assumed to be hostile to
redistribution.
Not surprisingly, the literature contains a lively debate as to
whether all of the foregoing interpretations “count” as libertarian.
Anarcho-capitalists assert, for example, that the only social
arrangement consistent with libertarian ideals is anarchy.50 Other
theorists argue that “libertarianism” and “classical liberalism” are
distinct from each other, while some scholars consider the latter simply
a subset of the former.51 This Article sidesteps that debate. For our
purposes, what matters is that there is a set of beliefs that are
distinguishable from utilitarianism and liberal egalitarianism and that
have much in common with each other. Despite differing in how rigidly
they adhere to these views, many who hold them refer to themselves as
“libertarians” and are often referred to as such by others, even if the
most rigid seek to limit the term’s use. It is, therefore, reasonable to
consider these theories as a class, just as resource egalitarianism

46.
See, e.g., DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM (3d ed.
2014); MICHAEL HUEMER, THE PROBLEM WITH POLITICAL AUTHORITY (2013); MURRAY
ROTHBARD, THE ETHICS OF LIBERTY (1982).
47.
Even here, however, classical liberals differ among themselves in how
strictly they define “public goods.”
48.
Although left-libertarians debate precisely how much redistribution is
justified, agreement generally exists that left libertarianism countenances more-thanminimal redistribution.
49.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
50.
See, e.g., ROTHBARD, supra note 46.
51.
Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN
CASE FOR CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 1–12 (2003) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM]
(distinguishing between classical liberalism and libertarianism), with TOMASI &
ZWOLINSKI, supra note 45, at 35–37 (classifying classical liberalism as a subset of
libertarianism).
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includes room for both those who do and do not believe in the
legitimacy of resource claims based on expensive tastes.52
Within this family of theories, justifications for limited amounts of
redistribution can be found in both minimal state libertarianism and
classical liberalism. Of course, no such case can be found in anarchocapitalism, which rejects even a minimal state devoted only to
protecting life and property. Although anarcho-capitalism has some
staunch defenders among philosophers, its supporters are a very small
minority both within and without the legal academy, even among selfidentified libertarians. Our acknowledgement that a UBI cannot be
justified on anarcho-capitalist grounds is, we think, a modest
concession and an obvious one; we do not think the concession
seriously undermines the claim that (the bulk of) libertarians should
consider seriously the case for a UBI. This Article, therefore, omits
further mention of anarcho-capitalism, focusing instead on minimal
state libertarianism and classical liberalism. The remainder of this
Section fleshes out these theories and demonstrates how each can
support some—albeit limited—redistribution of resources mediated by
the state.
A. Minimal State Libertarianism
Most legal scholars associate minimal state libertarianism with
Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory and John Locke’s theory of natural
property rights and self-ownership, so we shall begin there. According
to Locke, (1) natural resources in the state of nature are un-owned, but
(2) each individual has a property right to his own person and labor.53
This latter principle of self-ownership means that individuals have the
same type of ownership rights over themselves that property owners
hold with respect to inanimate objects: “each individual has strong
moral claims over the elements which constitute her person, e.g., her
body parts, her talents, and her energies.”54 These ownership rights
52.
Some resource egalitarians argue that individuals are born with expensive
tastes, much like one might be born with brown hair or a bum leg. Someone who
prefers champagne, for example, is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a beer lover in terms of
pursuing her vision of the good life, given that she requires more resources simply
because of the chance circumstances of her birth—much like Tiny Tim requires more
resources than an able-bodied individual. Other resource egalitarians, however, reject
this notion. For an overview of this debate, see Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of
Opportunity and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 91 B.U. L. REV. 601, 629–31 (2011).
53.
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 19 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690).
54.
Eric Mack, The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean
Proviso, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 186, 186 (1995) [hereinafter Mack, Self-Ownership];
Vallentyne & van der Vossen, supra note 45.

HEMEL – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1206

1/19/2018 2:50 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

include control rights, meaning the right to use one’s body and to
preclude others from using it.55 A key component of all libertarian
theories is that individuals own their own labor and are not, as a first
principle, required to contribute that labor for the common good.
Because each individual owns her labor, Locke reasons that each
individual can acquire property rights in a given resource by mixing her
labor with it.56 Yet the justifiability of property rights acquired through
such mixing is subject to several conditions, the most important of
which (known as the “Lockean proviso” or the “sufficiency
requirement”)57 is that one can justifiably acquire property rights in
natural resources only if “enough, and as good” is left for others.58 If
this requirement is met, Locke maintains that nobody else has a right to
those resources, suggesting that taxation violates property rights.59
These ideals appear almost three hundred years later in the most
influential modern exposition of libertarian thought, Robert Nozick’s
1974 book Anarchy, State and Utopia.60 There, Nozick crafts what he
terms the “entitlement theory” to rebut utilitarian and egalitarian calls
for redistribution. The initial building block of the entitlement theory is
the idea of the separateness of persons. As Nozick puts it:
There are only individual people, different individual people,
with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for
the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others.
Nothing more. . . . To use a person in this way does not
sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a
separate person, that his is the only life he has.61
From this, Nozick infers that forcing one person to work for
another’s purpose violates the separateness of persons. And that, in
Nozick’s view, is exactly what redistribution of income does. If
“forcing each person to work five extra hours each week for the benefit
of the needy” would violate the separateness of persons, so too would
“a system that takes five hours’ wages in taxes.”62 Thus, “[t]axation of
55.
Vallentyne & van der Vossen, supra note 45.
56.
LOCKE, supra note 53, at 19.
57.
Id. at 21. Locke also noted a second limitation—the spoilage limitation—
which prohibits an individual from appropriating more resources than can be used
before they spoil. Id.
58.
Jeremy Waldron, Nozick and Locke: Filling the Space of Rights, 22 SOC.
PHIL. & POL’Y 81, 89 (2005).
59.
LOCKE, supra note 53, at 30.
60.
NOZICK, supra note 43, at 33.
61.
Id.
62.
See id. at 169.
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earnings from labor is on par with forced labor” and, as such, is
unjust.63 Respecting the separateness of persons, therefore, requires the
state to eschew redistributive taxation.
Having set out Nozick’s basic argument against redistributive
taxation, we next seek to complicate it. The rest of the Section explores
potential ways to reconcile some amount of redistribution with the
separateness-of-persons principle upon which Nozick’s argument is
premised.
1. VINDICATING THE SEPARATENESS OF PERSONS
Philosopher Eric Mack supplies the foundation for a first argument
in favor of redistributive taxation within a Nozickian framework.64 We
trace that argument here and then explain why the last step of Mack’s
argument requires amendment.
Mack begins by asking us to imagine a fully prepared hiker on a
well-planned excursion. Through no fault of her own, she encounters
unpredicted and fatally cold temperatures.65 The hiker comes across a
locked but unoccupied cabin in the woods whose shelter, fire, and
blankets would save her life. Entering the cabin to save her life,
however, would violate the owner’s property rights.
In Mack’s view, the “Freezing Hiker” is nonetheless justified in
entering. The “most basic intuition,” he says, is that “no plausible
moral theory” would require the faultless hiker to freeze to death.66
“Even more clearly,” Mack writes, “no moral theory that builds upon
the separate value of each person’s life and well-being can hold that
Freezing Hiker is morally bound to grin and bear it.”67 For these
63.
Id.
64.
Eric Mack, Non-Absolute Rights and Libertarian Taxation, 23 SOC. PHIL.
& POL’Y 109, 109 (2006).
65.
Id. at 119.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. Classical liberal Loren Lomasky offers a similar take on the Freezing
Hiker. Much like Mack refers to “moral theor[ies] that build[] upon the separate value
of each person’s life and well-being,” Lomasky starts by conceptualizing individuals as
project-pursuers. Id.; Loren E. Lomasky, Compensation and the Bounds of Rights, in
COMPENSATORY JUSTICE: NOMOS XXXIII 24 (1991). Because each individual has an
interest in pursuing her projects with as little interference by others as possible,
individuals have a mutual interest in not interfering with others’ project pursuits. As
Lomasky explains, “[b]asic rights duly emerge as affording . . . those moral constraints
that impose minimal demands on the forbearance of others such that individuals can
pursue projects amidst a world of similar beings, each with his own life to lead, and
each owing the same measure of respect to others that they owe to him.” Lomasky,
supra at 25–26 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lomasky further argues, however,
that if “scrupulous regard for another’s moral space would directly jeopardize one’s
own standing as a project pursuer, then all bets are off.” Id. at 29. The Freezing Hiker
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reasons, Mack believes that libertarianism must tolerate some violation
of private property rights—at least in the extreme circumstances of the
freezing hiker. To do otherwise would be to deny the premise upon
which Nozick’s entitlement theory is built: that each person is a
separate person, that his is the only life he has, and that he cannot be
compelled to sacrifice that life for others. That is, the Freezing Hiker
cannot be compelled to relinquish her (only) life simply because an
absolutist conception of private property rights would bar her from
entering the cabin.
Only instances of extreme need, however, justify violating the
owner’s property rights in Mack’s view. If our hiker were simply tired
and sore (and not in fatal peril), no violation would be justified.68 Mack
reasons as follows: As the number of people who are allowed to ignore
a cabin owner’s rights grows, so does the incentive of a cabin owner to
avoid situations where his rights will be violated. A cabin owner could,
for example, put stronger defenses around his cabin or move to a
warmer climate or more remote location with fewer hikers.69 Cabin
owners, therefore, have an incentive to limit the situations in which
hikers ignore their rights so that they may place their cabins where they
wish without costly defenses and still have adequate assurance that their
rights will be respected in all but the most extreme instances. Hikers
are likely to acquiesce to such limits, because they care much more
about avoiding death than discomfort.70
How does this translate to taxation? Instead of a freezing hiker
breaking into a cabin, imagine a homeless person who trespasses in our
garage to sleep there or a starving person who steals a loaf of bread

may thus enter the cabin. With respect to extremely indigent individuals who lack
“minimally decent life prospects,” Lomasky argues that such individuals lack a
mutually beneficial reason to acquiesce in respecting the rights of others. Id. at 38.
Providing such individuals some minimal safety net gives them a reason to acquiesce in
mutual non-interference. Id. Respecting individuals as project-pursuers thus creates
property rights in the first instance and limits their scope so as not to preclude
providing a basic safety net to the extremely indigent.
68.
Mack, supra note 64, at 129.
69.
Id. at 133.
70.
Id. at 134. Perhaps a more straightforward way to support this limitation
on the Freezing Hiker’s privilege is through an appeal to the cabin owner’s rights.
Insofar as the logs for the fire, the blankets, etc., are the fruits of the cabin owner’s
labor, the Freezing Hiker’s appropriation of those items for her own purposes is—
according to libertarian logic—akin to the involuntary indenture of the cabin owner.
One might concede that the Freezing Hiker is privileged to appropriate the cabin
owner’s labor when necessary to save her own life while also maintaining (without
inconsistency) that the Freezing Hiker has no such privilege for purposes of her own
comfort. In other words, the cabin owner’s right to his own labor yields only in an
emergency that threatens the Freezing Hiker’s life (or perhaps, life and health).
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cooling in our window.71 If the person is homeless or hungry for
reasons that are not his fault, then the “most basic intuition” underlying
Mack’s Freezing Hiker example would seem to apply here as well: a
moral theory predicated upon the value of each person’s separate life
must allow for self-protection in these direst of circumstances. Mack
acknowledges, though, that if such intrusions upon private property
rights are permissible, then “the social world is going to be at least
somewhat dangerous, morally risky, and irritatingly messy.”72
The solution, according to Mack, lies in a minimal safety net:
“what would do the trick,” he writes, “is some system for certifying
that individuals are faultlessly (or faultlessly enough) in sufficiently dire
straits (e.g., in danger of loss of life, limb, or health), coupled with a
system of provision of a minimal income . . . that would undo that
distress.”73 Mack reasons that if such a system existed, then those in
dire straits would have no justification to steal food from us or break
into our garages and tool sheds for shelter.74 Aside from any empirical
prediction about the frequency of trespasses, the minimal safety net
insures property owners against the “moral risk” of preventing the
starving person from obtaining the loaf of bread.75 It would serve to
“absolutize property rights” by removing the conditions under which
others can legitimately violate such rights.76
The foregoing reasoning, however, limits the provision of this
safety net in several ways. First, according to Mack, the state should
only provide it to people whose plight is not their “fault” (though Mack
is not entirely clear as to what he means by “fault”).77 Second, benefits
under the safety net should be basic—enough, perhaps, to provide for
“shelter, food, and basic medical care,” but not more.78 These
constraints ensure that encroachments on private property rights occur
71.
Id. at 112.
72.
Id. at 140.
73.
Id.
74.
Id. at 141.
75.
See id. at 125, 140.
76.
Id. at 140. Some might ask whether taxing all individuals preemptively to
prevent such incursions is just as damaging (if not more) to private property rights than
the harms that individual, random property owners would face if the destitute did break
into their homes for food and shelter. We believe that the former is less harmful and
more appealing from a libertarian perspective, in that the costs are predictable and are
spread throughout society (instead of the few individuals whose homes are broken into
bearing a disproportionate share of the damage).
77.
Id. at 122, 140. In some respects, narrowing beneficiaries in this manner
overlaps with some of the insights of luck egalitarianism, though luck egalitarianism
supports a far greater amount of redistribution and to a greater number of people. See
Fleischer, supra note 52.
78.
Mack, supra note 64, at 140.
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only when necessary to protect life, limb, or health, thereby
maximizing the encroachees’ property rights without endangering the
most basic interests of those in dire need. Third, Mack reasons that
individuals who ignore others’ property rights due to extreme need
should compensate the encroached-upon property owners whenever
possible. This leads him to favor some type of workfare requirement.
Mack’s last argument for a workfare requirement seems to assume
that the government can distinguish without error between those who
are capable of work and those who are not. But of course, work
capability is not readily observable (and the very notion of capability is
a subjective one). Consider the types of people incapable of work but
likely to be classified as capable: individuals with various mental
illnesses (e.g., depression), extreme cases of attention hyper-deficit
disorder, and difficult-to-diagnose forms of chronic pain. Libertarians—
who are generally skeptical of the state’s ability to implement social
programs—should be especially skeptical of any claim that the state can
distinguish the work-capable from the work-incapable without error.
The resulting irony is that a skepticism of state capacity militates
in favor of a more expansive state-provided safety net, given the state’s
(assumed) incapability of limiting the safety net to the truly workincapable. The individual who is incapable of work would be entitled to
the support of a minimal safety net under Mack’s argument, and absent
such a safety net, private property rights are “non-absolute” as against
the work-incapable individual. A minimal safety net that required either
work or a showing of disability would thus fail to absolutize private
property rights because it would still leave a class of individuals—those
wrongly classified as capable of work—who legitimately can encroach
upon the property of others.79
In sum, minimal state libertarians accept some amount of coercive
taxation so that the state can protect private property rights against
unjustified encroachment. Yet at least arguably, individuals who
faultlessly find themselves in dire need are justified in encroaching
upon the property of others. The state can absolutize private property
rights against such justified encroachments by providing a minimal
safety net for individuals who are in need without fault of their own.
Yet if the state is incapable of determining whose dire needs are
faultless, then the absolutization of private property requires a universal
system of redistribution.
79.
This, of course, reflects our view that it is a bigger mistake for individuals
who deserve aid to not receive aid than for individuals who do not deserve aid to
receive it. Although we hope to convince them otherwise, we recognize that some
libertarians will view the latter as worse than the former, and thank Kevin Vallier for
emphasizing this point to us.
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2. SATISFYING THE LOCKEAN PROVISO
Apart from the argument that the separateness of persons requires
a safety net, minimal state libertarians may also accept a limited amount
of redistributive taxation as a necessary precursor for satisfying the
Lockean proviso. Recall that the Lockean proviso holds that an
individual can justly acquire property rights in a resource by mixing her
labor with it if, and only if, “enough, and as good” is left for others.
As Nozick notes, the proviso cannot be interpreted literally to mean
that one must leave “enough, and as good” of the exact resource in
question for others. If it were, the proviso would be impossible to
fulfill with respect to any resource that is finite in quantity or variable
in quality.80
The proviso is thus frequently interpreted as meaning that others
cannot be made “worse off” in some sense by an appropriation or use.
Nozick and most other minimal state libertarians take that to mean that
others cannot be made “worse off” in welfare terms after an
appropriation as compared to before. In their view, the Lockean
proviso is satisfied as long as appropriation generates positive
externalities equal to or in excess of the value of the land at the time it
is appropriated.81 For example, Dana may comply with the Lockean
proviso if she plants a coconut grove on part of her acre and uses the
rest to build a coconut water factory,82 thus providing jobs to the others

80.
To see why, imagine a field of 100 farmable acres, and assume that one
acre of farmland is enough to feed a family. If Adam is the first farmer to find the field,
it appears that he can appropriate one acre of it by mixing with it his labor. After all,
there is plenty left for Bonnie, the next farmer who happens along. It appears she too
can appropriate an acre, since more than enough is left to meet the needs of Charlie
(the third arrival). And so on. The problem becomes clear when Zach, the 100th farmer
arrives. He cannot claim the last acre, for then nothing is left for the 101st arrival. But
under that reasoning, Yvonne should not have been able to claim the ninety-ninth
parcel, since her claiming the ninety-ninth parcel prevented Zach from claiming the
100th. Likewise, Xavier’s appropriation of the ninety-eighth parcel prevented Yvonne
from claiming the 99th. Working backwards then, it turns out Adam’s claiming of the
first acre did not, after all, leave “enough, and as good” for others. NOZICK, supra note
43, at 176, 178.
A similar line of reasoning applies with respect to quality variations. Imagine that
Dana is one of ten inhabitants on a ten-acre desert island. Dana appropriates one acre
for herself, leaving “as much” for the others. But if she appropriates the acre
containing all the fertile soil and the best views of the beach, she has not left the others
“as good.”
81.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Economic Efficiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 409 (1987).
82.
On the potential positive externalities of coconut water production for
tropical communities, see MARK RAMPOLLA, HIGH-HANGING FRUIT: BUILD SOMETHING
GREAT BY GOING WHERE NO ONE ELSE WILL 27–28 (2016).
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and contributing to the island’s economy such that her fellow islanders
are better off than they were.83
On one view, private appropriation almost always comports with
the proviso, since it encourages value-enhancing cultivation: Dana is
more likely to plant a coconut grove if she is assured that she can reap
its bounty without the risk that those who did not share in the labor will
harvest some of the coconuts for themselves. In other situations, private
appropriation encourages conservation by solving tragedy-of-thecommons problems that can arise from over-grazing, over-fishing or
over-cultivation.84 Assuming that the non-appropriators benefit (for
example, by being able to trade labor or other goods for Dana’s
coconuts or the fish from her beach), then the proviso is satisfied. In
such situations, Dana’s appropriation actually exceeds the baseline set
by the proviso in that she leaves “enough, and more, for others.”
That said, the claim that private property rights generate positive
externalities on net does not necessarily imply that nobody is made
worse off. As Matt Zwolinski writes:
Fortunately for fans of strong rights of private property,
private appropriation of natural resources generally does leave
enough and as good for others . . . . Unfortunately for fans of
strong rights of private property, the general prosperity
produced by private appropriation leaves open the possibility
that some, perhaps many, individuals are made worse off by
that appropriation. . . . But that doesn’t mean that we should
ignore the fact that the tide is rising and that property rights
are an important part of the cause. If rights of private
property fail to make everyone sufficiently better off to satisfy
the Lockean proviso, this doesn’t mean that we should throw
out such rights altogether. We just need to make sure that
something is done to help those whom the general tide of
prosperity has left behind. This is the role of a governmentfinanced safety net in libertarian theory.85

83.
KYMLICKA, supra note 45, at 115–17.
84.
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968);
David Schmidtz, When Is Original Appropriation Required?, 73 MONIST 504, 507–09
(1990); Clark Wolf, Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the
Interests of Future Generations, 105 ETHICS 791, 799–800 (1995).
85.
Matt Zwolinski, Property Rights, Coercion, and the Welfare State: The
Libertarian Case for a Basic Income for All, 19 INDEP. REV. 515, 521, 523 (2015)
(paragraph breaks omitted) [hereinafter Zwolinski, Property Rights]. One can follow
Zwolinski’s argument whether or not one accepts the empirical premise that “private
appropriation of natural resources generally does leave enough and as good for others.”
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Significantly, Zwolinski’s argument for a safety net on the basis of
the Lockean proviso assumes that private property rights make some set
of individuals worse off. How might this be? Although Zwolinski does
not address this specifically, we believe the following is a plausible
elaboration of his claim: a market economy based on the voluntary
transfer of private property generally satisfies the Lockean proviso on
the assumption that non-appropriators can trade their labor for a portion
of the surplus generated by appropriation. In modern society, then, a
functioning employment market essentially replaces the opportunity to
appropriate and use unowned natural resources that existed in the state
of nature. Instead of resources being there “for the taking” as they
were in the pre-property state, now jobs are there “for the taking.”86
When, however, individuals are locked out of the labor market, then
the private property regime has not provided them with “enough, and
as good.” Even if Dana’s appropriation of resources has left “enough,
and more,” for some, she does not satisfy the Lockean proviso so long
as “not enough, and less,” is left for individuals deprived of labor
market opportunities.
Some individuals might be unable to access the labor market due to
constraints imposed by the state, such as the minimum wage or
licensing laws. Of course, the fact that the state itself stands in the way
of full employment would likely not convince a minimal-state
libertarian to expand the state further by taxing for redistributive
purposes. That said, only the truest of free-market true believers would
argue that all unemployment is a function of state-imposed labor market
constraints. Disability (physical and intellectual), old age (and youth),
and lack of education, among other factors, would continue to prevent
some individuals from selling their labor at a wage rate above a
subsistence level even in the absence of any labor market regulation
whatsoever.
A hard-liner might argue that anyone living today, even if
unemployable, is still better off than he or she would be if no private
property existed at all. Yet the hard-liner’s hypothetical argument is far
from self-evidently correct. In a world without private property, some
individuals would starve—but not all. In a world with private property,
most individuals do not starve—but some do. The question of whether
anyone is worse off today with private property than she would have
been without is difficult to answer—and, we think, impossible to
answer confidently in the negative.

The important point for now is that libertarians may accept that premise without
denying that some individuals will in some circumstances be made worse off as a result.
86.
Mack, Self-Ownership, supra note 54, at 212–13.
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The minimal state libertarian thus finds herself facing something of
a dilemma. On the one hand, a regime of private property with no
redistribution runs the risk of violating the Lockean proviso. On the
other hand, it is not obvious that the Lockean proviso requires
redistributive taxes and transfers because it is not obvious that any (or
an appreciable number of) individuals are worse off in a world with
private property than they would be without. Exacerbating the dilemma
is the fact that neither the non-redistributive minimal state nor the
propertyless condition exist at present, and even if either did, it would
be impossible to observe how the utility of any single individual
changes across alternative regimes. Complicating matters further: the
advent of private property has facilitated important agricultural and
industrial innovations that likely allow the Earth to support a larger
population than it otherwise could or would. Comparing a world with
private property to a world without runs into what Derek Parfit termed
“the Non-Identity Problem”—the challenge of comparing two outcomes
in which a different set (and different number) of people exist.87
We cannot claim to have here a solution for the minimal state
libertarian’s dilemma, at least insofar as the minimal state libertarian
insists on evaluating the Lockean proviso against a propertyless
baseline. It seems unlikely, however, that the proper comparison point
is one’s material well-being before private appropriation of property,
when humans led much more primitive lives and starvation and death
loomed large. If so, then all appropriations would be just, rendering
any proviso pointless. Edmund could appropriate all the property in the
world and employ everyone else on terms essentially akin to slavery,
and if his employees had it slightly better than hunter-gatherers, the
proviso would be satisfied. On the other hand, the comparison cannot
be that individuals must be made better off by a given appropriation
than they would be under all possible alternative appropriations. Not
only is this unknowable, but it would render the proviso essentially
impossible to meet.
There are, however, two other plausible interpretations of the
Lockean proviso. The first interprets the proviso as meaning that
“enough, and as good,” is left for others if everyone has a sufficient
level of resources to meet their basic needs.88 One individual’s selfownership can be impacted by how others use their resources if that use
impinges on her ability to interface with the world.89 So too, an

87.
See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 351–78 (1986).
88.
Vallentyne & van der Vossen, supra note 45.
89.
This has led Eric Mack to call for a “self-ownership proviso,” arguing
that individuals should not be able to use their resources in ways that severely impact
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individual needs some baseline amount of resources to exercise her own
self-ownership. In order to be able to use one’s self, an individual
needs oxygen, food, water, and other basic necessities. Resources
provide opportunities for one’s “self-preservation and selfgovernment,”90 meaning that after appropriation, “[w]hat must be
guaranteed to each person is the opportunity of a living—a condition of
nondependence, in which one is free to better oneself, govern one’s
own existence, and enjoy the goods God has provided for all.”91 If
private appropriation or use denies an individual access to these
necessities, the individual’s self-ownership is infringed.92
Although the positive externalities created by a free market and
private property will on net enhance most individuals’ self-ownership,
some individuals will, unfortunately, find their powers of selfownership diminished. In the latter situations, others are exercising
their property rights in ways that impinge on these individuals’ selfownership. Providing these individuals with basic necessities protects
their rights to self-ownership and by so doing assures that the proviso is
met with respect to all members of society. At the same time, limiting
any such redistribution to the necessities protects the self-ownership and
private property rights of the individuals who are made better off by
private appropriation.
We also offer here a second interpretation of the proviso, one that
posits that the appropriate basis of comparison is not any prehistoric
state of nature, but plausible modern-day alternatives to the extant
property rights regime. Under this interpretation, private appropriation
of resources leaves others at least as well off if and only if such
others—thinking rationally and looking out for their own interests—
would not choose to prevent such appropriative acts from occurring. In
making this judgment, individuals consider the range of likely outcomes
under alternative property regimes (or propertyless regimes), rather
than the unlikely possibility of permanent reversion to statelessness.

another’s “‘world-interactive powers,’ i.e., capacities to affect [one’s] extra-personal
environment in accord with [one’s] purposes.” Mack, supra note 86, at 186–87.
90.
A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 292 (1992).
91.
Id. at 293 (emphasis in original).
92.
See Avery Kolers, Removing the Commons: A Lockean Left-Libertarian
Approach to the Just Use and Appropriation of Natural Resources, NOTRE DAME PHIL.
REVS. (Feb. 2, 2014) (book review), http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/removing-the-commonsa-lockean-left-libertarian-approach-to-the-just-use-and-appropriation-of-naturalresources/ [https://perma.cc/794E-5CQ3] (arguing that use of natural resources
impedes self-ownership to the extent that it degrades natural resources such as air);
SIMMONS, supra note 90, at 288 (grounding this argument in Locke’s assertions that
appropriation can do no harm and in his discussions of money).
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To illustrate: Imagine a country with 100 acres of land and 100
people living under primitive conditions. One of the 100, Gaston, then
appropriates all the land for himself and employs his compatriots as
low-wage workers. When the ninety-nine others object, Gaston
responds that his compatriots are all better off than they were in the
primitive state preceding his act of appropriation. The others disagree.
They say that if Gaston had not appropriated all 100 acres for himself,
they eventually would have organized themselves into a community that
allocated one acre to each individual. They also argue that they would
be better off as yeoman farmers in an egalitarian society than as lowwage workers under Gaston’s control. And when Gaston disputes that
this ever would have happened, the others point out that many countries
around them ultimately arrived at political and economic arrangements
that did not result in all but one individuals being serfs to a single lord.
Gaston then offers two counterarguments. First, he says, even if
his compatriots ultimately would have arrived at a more egalitarian
allocation of resources, that would have taken time. Gaston says he has
improved their welfare over the long run because he lifted them out of
the primitive state much earlier. And second, he says, while it is
possible that the country otherwise would have evolved into a Swedenlike social welfare state, it also might have evolved into a Democratic
Republic of the Congo-like state—ravaged by civil unrest, and with a
per-capita income even below the meager wages that Gaston pays each
worker.
Gaston then puts the point another way: “If you all could go back
in time and prevent me from appropriating all 100 acres for myself,
would you? Even if that means you would have spent (indefinitely)
longer living in the primitive state? And even if that means you might
have ended up as a modern-day Congo instead of a modern-day
Sweden? Would you really rather roll the dice again instead of having
me take charge?”
Gaston’s challenge to his compatriots is a difficult one. But the
fact that his compatriots are better off than in the primitive state does
not prove that their answer to his question would be negative. Popular
uprisings occur not because the populous believes it would be better off
in the state of nature, but because the populous believes it would be
better off rolling the dice again. In other words, we might say that the
Lockean proviso that others be left “at least as well off” is satisfied if
others, knowing what they know at the time, would prefer that (or
would be indifferent as to whether) the act of appropriation occurs.
Such a judgment entails a comparison between circumstances under the
status quo and the range of plausible scenarios that might have
transpired in the absence of the appropriative act.
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This approach is similar in many ways to the classical liberal
approach, to which we will turn momentarily. We suggest that it too
may be a valid interpretation of the Lockean proviso: an act of
appropriation leaves others at least as well off if and only if such
others—thinking rationally and looking out for their own interests—
would not choose to prevent the appropriative act from occurring.
Importantly, whether individuals would choose to prevent the
appropriative act from occurring depends (in part) on how well off they
are given the appropriative act. In the case of Gaston and his ninetynine compatriots, the answer depends (at least in part) on how much
Gaston pays his employees.
On this view, a basic income raises the welfare of individuals who
gain the least from the current allocation of resources and, accordingly,
increases the probability that the present regime of private property
rights makes those individuals at least as well off as if prior
appropriative acts had not occurred. Insofar as a basic income increases
the probability that the Lockean proviso is satisfied, it strengthens the
argument that the existing property regime is just. The argument thus
operates similarly to the “absolutization” argument above: a basic
income serves a legitimating function in a state with robust protections
for private property. Absent a basic income or some other sort of
wealth-sharing mechanism, a system of private property flunks the
Lockean proviso if some members of society are left in circumstances
that would rationally lead them to re-roll the dice.
3. RECTIFICATION
A third justification for redistribution within a minimal state
libertarian framework is one that Nozick himself anticipated:
redistribution as rectification. To understand this argument, it helps to
step back and consider Nozick’s principles of “justice in acquisition”
and “justice in transfer,” which comprise part of his entitlement theory.
The first of those two principles holds that if an initial acquisition of
property is just, the holder can do with her property whatever she
pleases.93 And if we start from a position in which all holdings are just,
then the principle of justice in transfer posits that any subsequent
distribution arising from a series of voluntary transfers among

93.
More precisely, Adam can do almost whatever he wants, for Nozick
recognizes limits on one’s use in times of catastrophe. Nozick notes, for example, that
if Adam owns an island, he cannot force a shipwrecked castaway to leave. NOZICK,
supra note 43, at 180. Nor could Adam charge monopolistic prices if he owns the only
source of water in a desert. Id. This essentially creates a “Lockean proviso” on use,
because Adam cannot use his property in a way that makes others worse off.
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consenting participants is therefore also just. Thus, “[i]f the world were
wholly just,” according to Nozick, then the principles of “justice in
acquisition” and “justice in transfer” would “exhaustively cover the
whole subject of justice.”94 Redistributive taxation would have no role.
But what if our starting point is a scenario in which the distribution
of holdings is unjust? As Nozick notes: “Some people steal from
others, or defraud them, or enslave them . . . or forcibly exclude others
from competing in exchanges. None of these are permissible modes of
transition from one situation to another.”95 Under these circumstances,
according to Nozick, it is appropriate for the state to play a role in
“rectification”—i.e., transferring holdings among individuals so that
the resulting distribution approaches that which might have obtained if
the principles of justice in acquisition and justice in transfer had been
obeyed scrupulously.96
Ideally, pursuit of rectification would entail redistributing
resources from individuals who have benefitted from past injustices
(and, perhaps, their descendants) and to the victims of past injustices
(and again, at least arguably, their progeny).97 But as Nozick
acknowledged, that ideal might be unrealizable because we lack
sufficient information about who benefitted from and who was harmed
by injustices in the past. Nozick therefore suggested that something like
a modestly redistributive tax system might serve as a “rough rule of
thumb” intended “to approximate the general results of applying the
principle of rectification.”98 That is, if “those from the least well-off
group in the society have the highest probabilities of being the
(descendants of) victims of the most serious injustice who are owed
compensation by those who benefitted from the injustices,” and the
beneficiaries of past injustices are “assumed to be better off,” then
94.
Id. at 151.
95.
Id. at 152.
96.
See id. at 152–53. Many scholars interpret Nozick as implying that
rectification is a duty of the state and therefore justifiably financed by taxation. See, Jan
Narveson, Present Payments, Past Wrongs: Correcting Impressions from Nozick on
Restitution, 1 LIBERTARIAN PAPERS 1, 3 (2009) (noting that many scholars view the just
use of taxation for purposes of rectification as an “implication[] widely attributed” to
Nozick’s theory “including, apparently . . . Nozick himself” but disagreeing with that
implication); Adam James Tebble, The Tables Turned: Wilt Chamberlain Versus Robert
Nozick on Rectification, 17 ECON. & PHIL. 89, 93 (2001) (assuming “safely” that the
source of rectifying compensation will be taxation).
97.
Unfortunately, Nozick’s discussion of rectification is rather sparse.
NOZICK, supra note 43, at 153 (choosing “not [to] attempt [the] task” of specifying the
details of the principles of acquisition of holdings, transfer of holdings, and
rectification). He does, however, suggest in passing that Rawls’s difference principle
might serve as a rough means of implementing rectification. Id. at 231–32.
98.
Id.
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redistributing from the haves to the have-nots may be a way (albeit an
imperfect way) of honoring the rectification principle.99 On this view,
the desirability of redistributive taxation depends upon the “particular
history” of a society.100 Nozick did not deny that the principles of
justice in acquisition and justice in transfer had been violated numerous
times over the course of American history, such that redistribution for
the purpose of rectification was warranted.101 Unfortunately, Nozick’s
brief discussion of rectification failed to address comprehensively two
key problems that arise in its implementation.
First, Nozick never explained precisely from whom and to whom
such transfers should occur (from the rich to the poor?; from all white
Americans to all African-Americans and Native Americans?; from
descendants of slave-owners to descendants of slaves?).102 We bracket
that question here, except to note that determining to whom rectification
should be owed is akin to determining whether the Freezing Hiker is
faultless or not. As we argued previously, the state’s inability to
determine whether someone is capable of work counsels in favor of
abandoning work requirements. We make a similar argument here: the
state’s inability to determine who is poor on account of past injustice
suggests that a universal program like a UBI—with redistribution to all
who fall below a threshold level of economic well-being—may be the
best way to implement Nozick’s principle of rectification.103
A second complication lies in determining the amount of
rectification due to victims of past injustice.104 Nozick suggests that the
appropriate solution is to recreate the pattern of holdings that would
have occurred “if the injustice had not taken place,” while recognizing
that identifying that pattern requires a number of assumptions and
probabilistic estimates.105 We recognize the difficulty inherent in such a
determination and acknowledge that full rectification may require
redistribution beyond the provision of a sufficientarian safety net.106 For
99.
Id.
100. Id.
101. See Waldron, supra note 58, at 103.
102. For an exploration of these difficulties, see Miranda Perry Fleischer,
Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1365–72
(2015).
103. As we shall explore later, by “universal” we mean not conditioned on a
showing of deservingness. We do envision limiting the net benefits to low-income
individuals, which is consistent with Nozick’s suggestion that redistributing to the least
well-off might provide a good rule of thumb for implementing rectification. NOZICK,
supra note 43, at 231.
104. See generally Narveson, supra note 85.
105. NOZICK, supra note 43, at 152–53.
106. See, e.g., Thomas Craemer, Estimating Slavery Reparations: Present
Value Comparisons of Historic Multigenerational Reparations Policies, 96 SOC. SCI. Q.
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present purposes, the key point is that one can be unsure as to how
much redistribution is required by the principle of rectification while
also believing with confidence that the number is more than zero. In
other words, uncertainty as to the requisite amount of redistribution is
not a viable argument against some amount of redistribution.
Finally, we note that insofar as the principle of rectification
supports some sort of transfer program, even if not a UBI, many of the
questions that we consider below (e.g., in cash or in-kind?; periodic vs.
lump-sum payments?) are directly relevant to program design.
Libertarians who reject the argument for a UBI in favor of a narrower
program of rectification should still be attentive to the design details of
a universal cash transfer scheme.
B. Classical Liberalism
We have first explored whether libertarianism justifies a safety net
on minimal state libertarian grounds. We should be clear, however, that
although some such theorists (such as Mack) may accept the legitimacy
of minimal redistribution, a sizeable number of other minimal state
libertarians disagree that so doing is within the state’s purview.107 In
these theorists’ view, the only purposes the state may legitimately
pursue are providing physical protection and enforcing contracts. And
while we have argued that the minimal state libertarians’ rejection of
redistributive taxation does not necessarily follow from Lockean and
Nozickian premises, we also acknowledge that our argument will not
win universal acceptance in minimal state libertarian quarters.
A second group of libertarians—classical liberals—believe,
however, that a slightly-more-than-minimal state can be justified.
Within classical liberalism, we identify three arguments for supporting
a UBI: first, that poverty relief can be justified as a public good;
second, that providing a “sufficientarian”108 safety net is mandated by
classical liberalism’s emphasis on consent; and third, that a UBI is the
best way to distribute revenue raised from Pigouvian taxation of

639, 639 (2015) (estimating present value of U.S. slave labor at $5.9 trillion to $14.2
trillion in 2009 dollars). Craemer’s estimates translate to approximately $140,000 to
$340,000 per person identifying as black or African American (alone or in
combination) in the 2010 Census. See Sonya Rastogi et al., The Black Population:
2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS, at 3 tbl.1 (Sept. 2011),
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3BBNAY9].
107. Fleischer, supra note 102, at 1376.
108. We further explain what we mean by “sufficientarian” below. See infra
text accompanying note 121.
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environmental externalities. Of these, we believe the second is the most
persuasive.
To provide context for these arguments, a brief explanation of
classical liberalism is in order. Although classical liberals—like
minimal state libertarians—oppose large scale welfare programs and
reject much current governmental regulation, they admit that in some
instances the government can engage in activities beyond acting as a
night watchman, such as providing public goods, prohibiting
monopolies, and reducing negative externalities. As Richard Epstein
has explained:
The missing . . . element of many classical libertarian
theories is that they do not offer a comprehensive explanation
of the role of forced exchanges in structuring a political
system. The principle of autonomy never permits a draft in
times of war. . . . The principle of freedom of contract cannot
distinguish between an ordinary sale and a cartel arrangement.
A categorical prohibition against taking does not recognize
any privilege to take property of others in time of necessity.
The stripped-down libertarian theories . . . preclude[] the use
of taxation, condemnation, and the state provision of
infrastructure. These practices were part and parcel of
government action long before the rise of the modern welfare
state. Figuring out why these institutions are needed and how
they should be designed and funded requires a major
correction to the starker versions of libertarian theory, which
is what the classical liberal approach seeks to supply. Yet by
the same token, the effort to respond to these difficulties does
not require us to abandon the vision of limited government
and fall into the deadly embrace of the welfare state. Even
after all these adaptations are made, government would
occupy a far smaller place than it holds under contemporary
political theory and constitutional law.109
While most minimal state libertarians clearly ground their
arguments in deontological theories, classifying the theoretical roots of
classical liberalism is a bit complicated.110 Many classical liberals—such
as Epstein, Friedman, and Hayek—use consequentialist arguments that
focus on the costs of government action and the benefits from free
markets coupled with robust private property rights.111 Hayek, for
109.
110.
111.

EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, supra note 51, at 7 (paragraph break omitted).
Fleischer, supra note 102, at 1377.
Id.
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example, emphasizes that free markets are superior to centralized
planning because of the diffusion of knowledge across individuals.112 In
a slightly different vein, Epstein focuses on the ability of private
property rights to solve problems such as the tragedy of the commons
more efficiently than statist interventions.113
Another type of reasoning used to justify a limited, classical liberal
state is contractarianism. Under this view, the coercion stemming from
the establishment of the state is legitimate only if it is justifiable to all
citizens. All citizens need not actually consent, but the order of affairs
must be such that they would consent to it. To illustrate, consider
Epstein’s elucidation of classical liberalism, in which “the justification
for the state depends upon [a] network of forced hypothetical
exchanges” whereby every individual is “required to surrender his right
to use force in exchange for the like promise of every other individual
to so refrain.”114 According to Epstein, these hypothetical exchanges
amount to a “Pareto-superior move,” meaning that the exchanges leave
each person at least as well off as she would be in the state of nature
(and leave at least some people better off).115 “In principle,” Epstein
says, “no person can object to a world in which the use of sovereign
power leaves him better off than he was with his natural
endowments.”116
Gerald Gaus offers a similar justificatory argument in the
philosophy literature. He starts from the premise that a just society
treats individuals as free (meaning that “each has a fundamental claim
to determine what are her obligations and duties”) and equal (meaning
that “members of the public are symmetrically placed insofar as no one
has a natural or innate right to command others or to impose obligations
112. See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
(1960) [hereinafter HAYEK, CONSTITUTION] (arguing, inter alia, that free markets are
more efficient than central planning because in a free market, those with the power to
make decisions, the individuals, are the same as those with the information on which
those decisions need to be based). Similarly, Friedman notes that “the great advances of
civilization, whether in architecture or painting, in science or in literature, in industry
or in agriculture, have never come from a centralized government.” MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 3 (40th anniversary ed. 2002).
113. These theorists, however, also incorporate deontological arguments about
the evils of coercion; an individual’s right to be free of coercion simultaneously limits
what government may do to further any given consequentialist goal (such as efficiency)
and justifies strong private property rights and free markets. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
SKEPTICISM, supra note 51, at 2–5 (discussing the interrelation of consequentialism and
natural rights); cf. FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 1–22 (arguing that free markets are a
necessary precursor to political freedom).
114. Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
49, 53 (1986).
115. Id.
116. Id.
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on them”).117 Because individuals are free and equal, any coercion must
be justified to them. Free and equal individuals, however, will have
differing conceptions of how much coercion (if any) is justified. Gaus
reasons that given these different opinions, a just society is one which
each individual concludes is better than no state at all: “[i]f the system
of [strong] property rights is to be publicly justified, it must be the case
that everyone has reason to accept it and no one has reason to reject
it.”118
1. CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND A SAFETY NET
As we just saw, a variety of theoretical approaches support
classical liberalism. And although classical liberalism generally
militates against large-scale government redistributive efforts, several
theorists in the classical liberal tradition—including Adam Smith,
Hayek, Friedman, and Epstein—have argued that providing a limited
safety net to the poor is consistent with classical liberalism.119 This
concern is sufficientarian in nature, however, and not egalitarian.120 By
this, we mean that classical liberal theorists are concerned with
providing a minimum level of material resources for all individuals, but
are not concerned with inequality as such.121 Hayek, for example,
supports a minimum income that provides “security against severe
physical privation” rather than trying to assure “a given standard of life
. . . determined by comparing the standard enjoyed by a person or a
group with that of others.”122 As to the latter, Hayek notes that aiming
for a “more even or more just distribution of goods”123 interferes with
freedom to a degree that providing a minimal safety net does not.

117. Gerald Gaus, Coercion, Ownership, and the Redistributive State:
Justificatory Liberalism’s Classical Tilt, 27 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 233, 234 (2010)
[hereinafter Gaus, Coercion].
118. GERALD F. GAUS, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 188–91 (1999) [hereinafter GAUS,
SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY].
119. JOHN TOMASI, FREE MARKET FAIRNESS 125 (2012).
120. Id. at 126–27; see also Jason Brennan & John Tomasi, Classical
Liberalism, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 115, 122–23 (David
Estlund ed., 2012) (explaining a sufficientarian case for the well-being of the
disadvantaged).
121. On the distinction between sufficientarianism and egalitarianism, see
Richard Arneson, Egalitarianism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Summer
ed.
2013),
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entries/egalitarianism/
[https://perma.cc/ZW6T-JC3E].
122. HAYEK, CONSTITUTION, supra note 112, at 259.
123. Id.
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Why do (some) classical liberals support a minimal safety net? We
focus here on two such arguments: (1) that poverty relief is a public
good subject to free rider problems, and (2) that a minimal safety net is
necessary to ensure that state coercion is justifiable to all.
a. Redistribution as a Public Good
As mentioned previously, classical liberalism makes room for
government provision of public goods (although most classical liberals
would argue that the scope of government currently extends well
beyond the provision of public goods).124 Under this view, the main
role of government is to provide the framework necessary for a
smoothly functioning free market.125 Yet even a functioning market is
unlikely to provide public goods in optimal quantities. Consider clean
air: once clean air is provided for one person, it is impossible to
preclude others from also enjoying it. This non-excludability is thought
to lead to free-riding, which in turn causes private actors to underproduce such goods. If so, the government may justifiably act to
remedy market failure so that the optimal level of public goods is
produced.126
Mark Pauly suggests two ways in which redistribution might bear
the qualities of a public good.127 One is that poverty might contribute to
crime, and so poverty alleviation through redistribution might reduce
crime.128 In this way, redistribution is a public good to the same extent
that policing is a public good.129 The theoretical and evidentiary support
for the redistribution-reduces-crime claim, however, is mixed. On one
hand, redistribution that is limited to the non-incarcerated population
increases the relative cost of crime, which we might expect to result in
124. Gaus, Coercion, supra note 117, at 235; accord Gerald F. Gaus, Public
and Private Interests in Liberal Political Economy, Old and New, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 183, 192–93 (Stanley I. Benn & Gerald F. Gaus eds., 1983).
125. FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 25–28.
126. See, e.g., id. at 27–32; LIONEL ROBBINS, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
POLICY IN ENGLISH CLASSICAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 188–89 (1952); GAUS, SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 118, at 170, 188–91. A second reason for the underprovision
of public goods by the free market is nonrivalry: the fact that any one individual’s
enjoyment of the good does not reduce the utility of the good to others. Thus the
marginal cost of providing the good to an additional individual is zero. Yet the provider
of the good must charge more than zero in order to cover costs (much less make a
profit). The result is that some individuals who value the good at more than marginal
cost but less than the provider-set price do not enjoy the good. Goods that are nonrival
but excludable are considered to be “quasi-public goods.” Id.
127. Mark V. Pauly, Income Redistribution as a Local Public Good, 2 J. PUB.
ECON. 35, 35 (1973).
128. Id. at 37–38.
129. Id. at 38.
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a lower crime rate. On the other hand, redistribution financed through
income taxation reduces the return from licit income-generating activity
relative to illicit activity, assuming that the former is taxed and the
latter is not. That, in turn, might be expected to result in more crime.
Which of these effects predominates is an empirical question without a
clear answer.130
Second, Pauly posits that poverty “offends the esthetic and moral
sensibilities” of individuals who encounter it.131 Poverty alleviation
through redistribution might thus be a public good in much the same
way that city beautification is a public good: it increases the aesthetic
pleasure (or decreases the aesthetic displeasure) experienced by all.
Milton Friedman conceptualized poverty relief in this manner when
advocating for the negative income tax. Although he first expresses a
preference for voluntary charity, he then proceeds to accept
“governmental action to alleviate poverty; to set, as it were, a floor
under the standard of life of every person in the community.”132 As
Friedman explains:
I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefited by its
alleviation; but I am benefited equally whether I or someone
else pays for its alleviation . . . . To put it differently, we
might all of us be willing to contribute to the relief of
poverty, provided everyone else did. We might not be willing
to contribute to the same amount without such assurance. In
small communities, public pressure can suffice . . . . In the
large impersonal communities that are increasingly coming to
dominate our society, it is much more difficult for it to do
so.133
By emphasizing how we all benefit from poverty relief regardless
of whether we contribute to it, Friedman illustrates how we can

130. For a further explanation of the uncertain theoretical connection between
redistribution and crime rates, as well as a survey of the then-existing empirical
literature, see Ayse Imrohoroglu, et al., On the Political Economy of Income
Redistribution and Crime, 41 INT’L ECON. REV. 1 (2000). See also Pablo Fajnzylber, et
al., Inequality and Violent Crime, 45 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2002) (concluding on the basis
of cross-country comparisons that higher poverty is correlated with more crime); John
R. Hipp & Daniel K. Yates, Ghettos, Thresholds, and Crime: Does Concentrated
Poverty Really Have an Accelerating Increasing Effect on Crime?, 49 CRIMONOLOGY
955, 955 (2011) (concluding on the basis of a comparison across census tracts that
poverty has a positive but diminishing effect on crime).
131. Pauly, supra note 127, at 37.
132. FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 191.
133. Id.
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conceptualize poverty relief as a public good for which voluntary
contributions are insufficient.134
To be sure, the fact that Friedman would be willing to contribute
to poverty relief does not mean that everyone shares the same charitable
impulse. A less beneficent individual (we’ll call him Scrooge) might
ask: “Why should I be compelled to pay for a safety net just because
Friedman has an aesthetic or ethical preference for poverty
alleviation?” Friedman does not address this objection but it is not hard
to see how he might.
Scrooge’s objection to taxation for the purpose of poverty
alleviation is not unlike, say, Lance’s objection to taxation for the
purpose of highway construction: “Why should I be compelled to pay
for roads just because others prefer to travel by automobile? I would be
happy to get around on my bicycle.” Of course, even the professional
cyclist benefits from roads: he eats food and wears clothes that have
traveled by truck (and he might ride on those roads when not training
on trails). But we can without difficulty imagine individuals who do not
desire particular public goods (e.g., the pacifist who does not want a
military; the Amish farmer who does not want highways). Few classical
liberals believe that taxation for the purposes of public good provision
should be subject to a heckler’s veto. Classical liberals might seek to
neutralize the heckler’s veto by positing that since no public good
would garner unanimous support, individuals instead consent to the
provision of a bundle of public goods that they prefer when compared
to a world with no public goods.135
This still leaves us to ask whether Friedman’s argument for
poverty relief as a public good proves too much. The fact that a good is
non-rival and non-excludable (and therefore “public” in the technical
sense) cannot be a sufficient condition for funding it through taxation.
Suppose that Leona136 says: “I am distressed by the suffering of
Malteses; I am benefited by the alleviation of such suffering; but I am
benefited equally whether I or someone else pays for its alleviation.”
Should the classical liberal state then pay for the care of small
hypoallergenic dogs with long and silky white hair?
134. See id.; see also Mack & Gaus, supra note 45, at 124 (explaining
Friedman’s approach).
135. See GAUS, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 118, at 188–98.
136. Cf. Cara Buckley, Cosseted Life and Secret End of Millionaire Maltese,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/nyregion/leonahelmsleys-millionaire-dog-trouble-is-dead.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208180232/http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/n
yregion/leona-helmsleys-millionaire-dog-trouble-is-dead.html?mtrref=undefined]
(noting that the billionaire real estate and hotel tycoon Leona Helmsley left $12 million
to her Maltese dog Trouble, though a court later lowered the amount to $2 million).
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The mere fact that some subset of the population perceives a
benefit from the alleviation of Maltese suffering cannot be enough to
justify state intervention. Instead, it is quite likely that a classical liberal
would also insist upon some proof of market failure before funding a
given “public” good through taxation. Recall that classical liberalism
justifies government funding of public goods to remedy market failure,
that is, the sub-optimal funding of such goods due to free-rider or other
problems. That a good is non-rival and non-excludable does not
necessarily mean that free-riding is a problem leading to sub-optimal
levels of the good. It is, of course, quite difficult to determine the
optimal level of a given public good due to the very absence of a
market.137 But the fact that few Maltese dogs are suffering in the streets
and in animal shelters might suggest there is a working market for
caring for such dogs.138 In contrast, the glut of pit bulls at animal
shelters might suggest that the market provides for their care at
suboptimal levels.
To determine whether poor relief and other public goods suffer
from market failure, perhaps a requirement of majority (or
supermajority?) support should be added to the conditions of nonrivalry and non-excludability. This raises its own set of problems,
however, and does not fully resolve our dilemma. It is true that, as
Charles Murray notes, the vast majority of the population supports
some amount of redistribution. Murray puts the figure at “upward of 90
percent.”139 That said, just because a majority supports the provision of
a good through taxation does not mean a classical liberal will support
government intervention: majoritarian preferences cannot undercut the
limits that classical liberalism imposes on government. At the same
time, just because a majority does not support the provision of a good
through taxation does not mean that the classical liberal will feel the
same: the classical liberal might, for instance, ascribe the lack of
majoritarian support to an information deficit among voters.
In sum, conceiving of poverty relief as a public good goes some
way toward reconciling redistribution with classical liberalism, but this
approach also runs into problems. The classical liberal who justifies
redistribution on these grounds must explain how we know whether an
aesthetic or ethical preference is sufficiently broad-based as to support
government intervention. We do not write off the possibility of a
coherent justification for redistributive taxation based on public good
137. For a longer discussion of this dilemma, see Fleischer, supra note 102, at
1393, 1398.
138. Perhaps one could view enjoying the companionship of a Maltese as a tiein that minimizes free-riding. See id. at 1396–97.
139. MURRAY, supra note 4, at 3.
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principles. The challenge for classical liberals, though, is to formulate a
version of the public-good argument for poverty alleviation that does
not implicitly cede classical liberalism’s commitment to limited
government (or else to acknowledge that classical liberalism dissolves
into something approximating modern-day liberalism without a
preceding modifier).
b. Justificatory Arguments
The final set of arguments for a safety net rests on the ideal that a
societal order must be justifiable to all. Several variations of this appear
in the philosophy literature.140 Recall that philosopher Gerald Gaus
argues that because individuals are free and equal, any coercion must
be justified to them.141 A system of strong private property rights,
therefore, is justifiable only if “everyone has a reason to accept it and
no one has reason to reject it.”142 Gaus then recognizes that “some
people inevitably are left out of the general abundance of modern
economies,”143 and that rational individuals will not consent to a social
and economic system with strong private property rights if that system
makes them worse off. A sufficientarian safety net should, therefore, be
provided to those individuals so that they have reason to accept a
system with strong property rights.144 A variant of this reasoning is that
to give all individuals a “rational stake in the moral community
established by [a] system of [private property] rights,” a minimal safety
net is necessary to get the buy-in of those lacking basic necessities.145

140. See, e.g., Zwolinski, Basic Income, supra note 8, at 7.
141. See text surrounding notes 117–118.
142. GAUS, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 118, at 170, 188–91.
143. Id. at 170.
144. Id.
145. See LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY
126–29 (1989) [hereinafter LOMASY, MORAL COMMUNITY]; LOREN E. LOMASKY,
Liberty and Welfare Goods: Reflections on Clashing Liberalisms, in RIGHTS ANGLES
165 (2016). Lomasky’s argument stems from his characterization of individuals as
project pursuers who have an incentive to adopt a cooperative strategy of noninterference with others’ pursuit of their projects. LOMASKY, MORAL COMMUNITY,
supra at 25–27, 31–34, 65–79. The boundaries of this non-interference (which is quite
large, since each person wants as much freedom as possible for project pursuit) become
rights, including property rights. Id. at 73–74. This justifies a limited state with limited
taxation, but no more. Id. at 79–83. With respect to a safety net, Lomasky reasons:
If a person is otherwise unable to secure that which is necessary for his
ability to live as a project pursuer, then he has a rightful claim to provision
by others who have a surplus beyond what they require to live as project
pursuers. In that strictly limited but crucial respect, basic rights extend
beyond liberty rights to welfare rights.
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A similar argument also might be made based on Epstein’s
conception of the classical liberal state as a “network of forced
hypothetical exchanges” whereby individuals surrender their rights to
use force in exchange for others’ promises to do the same.146 Because
these exchanges amount to Pareto-superior moves,147 Epstein believes
that “no person can object” to a “world in which the use of sovereign
power leaves him better off than he was with his natural
endowments.”148 The absence of a basis to object, therefore, legitimizes
the state.
It is not entirely clear, however, what Epstein means when he says
that “[i]n principle, no person can object” to a bargain that entails a
“Pareto-superior move.”149 If the statement is an empirical claim about
the way that individuals behave when confronted with proposed
exchanges that would leave them at least as well off materially as
before, then the statement is manifestly false. Experiments involving
“Ultimatum Game” scenarios consistently demonstrate that individuals
reject offers they perceive to be lopsided, even if Pareto-superior. In
one familiar version of the game, an “Allocator” is told that she can
divide ten dollars between herself and a “Recipient.” The Allocator’s
division of the ten dollars serves as an offer, which the Recipient can
accept or reject. If the Recipient accepts the offer, then the Allocator
walks away with the amount that she allocated to herself, and the
Recipient walks away with the amount that the Allocator offered to
him. If the Recipient rejects the offer, then the Allocator and Recipient
both walk away with zero. Note that for any offer greater than zero, the
Recipient is better off in material terms if he accepts the offer rather
than rejecting it. And yet across countries and cultures, Recipients tend
to reject offers that they perceive to be too low (even though above
zero). Richard Thaler finds in a review of such studies that recipients
tend to reject offers of less than about a quarter of the pot.150

Id. at 126. For a critique of these arguments see Tibor R. Machan, Against Lomaskyan
Welfare Rights, 14 REASON PAPERS 70, 70–75 (1989).
146. Epstein, supra note 114, at 53.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 195, 196–98 (1988) (reviewing literature). This is not to say that subjects prefer
perfect equality. Christina Starmans and co-authors find in a recent review of
laboratory studies and cross-cultural research that individuals across a wide range of
contexts are accepting of unequal distributions that result from unequal expenditures of
effort. See Christina Starmans et al., Why People Prefer Unequal Societies, NATURE
HUMAN BEHAV., Apr. 7, 2017, at 1, 1–3, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-0170082. But the studies reviewed by Starmans et al. still show a preference for some
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The forced hypothetical exchange imagined by Epstein is similar to
the Ultimatum Game in that acceptance is surplus-generating:
individuals are capable of generating greater material wealth with the
rule of law than without. Epstein’s claim is that so long as the surplus is
allocated such that all individuals are at least as well off as in the state
of nature, then the hypothetical exchange is justified even though it
entails force. The Ultimatum Game results pose a challenge for
Epstein: why is force justified under circumstances in which we have
strong reason to believe that the target of such force would object?
One can anticipate at least two possible responses. First, Epstein
might say that results of the Ultimatum Game in experimental settings
lack external validity. After all, the stakes in the experimental setting
are much smaller than in the state of nature. Yet even in high-stakes
versions of the Ultimatum Game, researchers observe individuals in the
Recipient role rejecting offers equivalent to their expenditures for an
entire month if they perceive the surplus division to be too lopsided.151
Second, Epstein might say that even if as an empirical matter
individuals do reject lopsided offers in the Ultimatum Game, as a moral
matter such rejections are unjustified. Yet the latter response would
amount to a concession that the classical liberal state cannot, in fact,
rest on hypothesized consent—a concession that seems to amount to
giving away the store.
To put the point more concretely, we can imagine two
individuals—”High Endowment” (or “High”) and “Low Endowment”
(or “Low”)—each of whom gains materially from the rule of law. We
know that High gains more in material terms from the rule of law than
Low does, because we can observe the delta between the income of
High-types in well-functioning states and the income of High-types in
failed states, and can compare that to the delta between the income of
Low-types in well-functioning states and Low-types in failed states.
Epstein’s version of classical liberalism would seem to require that both
High and Low would consent to the network of exchanges that the state
embodies. The findings from the Ultimatum Game suggest that Pareto
superiority is not a sufficient condition for Low’s consent. Low must
perceive the division of surplus to be fair enough that he does not
exercise his prerogative in the Recipient role to reject High’s offer.
One might at this point ask why we have styled High as the
Allocator and Low as the Recipient. Why not allow Low to occupy the
Allocator role, in which case the hypothetical-consent constraint is
redistribution of wealth—and, indeed, a more egalitarian distribution than the U.S.
status quo. Id.
151. See Lisa A. Cameron, Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game:
Experimental Evidence from Indonesia, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 47, 56 & n.16 (1999).
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satisfied as long as Low’s offer to High is sufficiently generous to High
such that High accepts the offer in her Recipient role? Instead of the
minimally redistributive arrangement that arises when High is the
Allocator, the assignment of Low to the Allocator role results in
maximal redistribution (i.e., redistribution up to the point that High is
indifferent between Low’s offer and the state of nature). Instead of
asking how much redistribution is needed so that Low does not walk
away from the table, we would ask how much soaking of the rich can
be sustained before High walks away from the table.
Epstein responds that “within the Lockean world, the
redistribution of income through the tax system is an unacceptable
function of government, for no exchange can be Pareto-superior if it
leaves some persons worse off.”152 Yet presumably even a
redistributive state can leave High at least as well off as in the state of
nature. Indeed, this conclusion follows arithmetically from the claim
that the rule of law is surplus-generating: the rule of law is Paretosuperior even if all the surplus is appropriated by Low. So if the
baseline is the state of nature, then both the non-redistributive state and
the redistributive state satisfy the Pareto superiority requirement.
Epstein assesses the redistributive state against the baseline of the nonredistributive state and says, in effect: “Aha! The redistributive state is
unjustifiable because it leaves some people (high-endowment
individuals) worse off than they would be in the non-redistributive
state.” And yet symmetrically, one could assess the non-redistributive
state against a baseline of the redistributive state and say similarly:
“Aha! The non-redistributive state is unjustifiable because it leaves
some people (low-endowment individuals) worse off than they would be
in the redistributive state.”
We do not seek to solve this challenge for classical liberal theory
here. Our more limited point is as follows: insofar as classical
liberalism’s argument from hypothetical consent is based on an actual
hypothesis as to how individuals would behave in bargaining, then the
state with zero redistribution appears to be problematic (because of the
likelihood that low-endowment individuals would reject the offer
notwithstanding the fact that it leaves them better off in material terms).
A classical liberal state that is justified on the basis of hypothetical
consent must redistribute at least enough such that the low-endowment
individual accepts the offer. We do not here attempt to identify the
upper boundaries of that redistribution. Our claim here is that some
amount of redistribution may be required by the classical liberal
framework.

152.

Epstein, supra note 114, at 68.
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2. CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND PIGOUVIAN TAXATION

Classical liberals also recognize that correcting negative
externalities can be an appropriate state role.153 To that end, some
classical liberals have recognized a role for the government to help curb
pollution by imposing Pigouvian taxes, which strive to reduce negative
externalities by requiring polluters to internalize the costs of their
activities.154 This concept overlaps somewhat with Lockean limits on
use, insofar as any individual who emits pollutants into the air or water
that negatively affect others does not leave “enough, and as good” for
her fellows. To satisfy the Lockean proviso, the polluter would need to
compensate her fellows for the harm she has caused, and a Pigouvian
tax with the revenues distributed among all affected is one way of
providing that compensation.
Based on these rationales, a minimal state libertarian might be
amenable to a UBI funded through Pigouvian taxation. Note that a UBI
funded through Pigouvian taxation would be modest but not
inconsequential. Consider that according to one estimate, the gross
external damages from air pollution across all sectors of the United
States economy in 2002 amounted to $184 billion (at 2000 price
levels).155 That would translate to $257 billion at 2016 price levels, or
roughly $800 per person per year.156 Soil and water pollution
externalities add to that figure. A comprehensive Pigouvian tax on
environmental externalities, with revenues redistributed to all who are
harmed by air, soil, and water pollution (which is to say, pretty much
everybody), might well be consistent with even a Nozickian version of
libertarianism while still resulting in a UBI of limited but not negligible
proportions.

153. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, supra note 51, at 7, 190–91 (acknowledging that in
some instances, the state may legitimately act to curb pollution). Recently, two
prominent Republicans suggested a carbon tax coupled with what is essentially a UBI.
See John Schwartz, ‘A Conservative Climate Solution: Republican Group Calls for
Carbon
Tax,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
7,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/science/a-conservative-climate-solutionrepublican-group-calls-for-carbon-tax.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208180404/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/s
cience/a-conservative-climate-solution-republican-group-calls-for-carbon-tax.html].
154. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM, supra note 51, at 190–93.
155. Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the
United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1664 tbl.1 (2011).
156. This figure assumes a U.S. population in the range of 325 million. For an
up-to-the-minute population estimate, see U.S. & World Population Clock, U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock
[https://perma.cc/4GMFKWVD?type=image].
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The argument that classical liberals should favor a UBI funded
from Pigouvian taxation strikes us as a plausible one, but we
acknowledge three counterarguments that might be mustered. First, one
might argue that the increase in welfare from the polluting activity acts
as compensation enough already (“Yes, coal pollutes, but we all benefit
from the electricity thereby generated”). Yet it is far from obvious that
pollution ultimately redounds to everyone’s benefit (and the claim
almost certainly does not hold for all forms of pollution). Perhaps one
could say that the individual whose electricity comes from wind or solar
power benefits in some sense from coal because coal power reduces
overall energy costs. But the argument is a tenuous one given that if
coal power were removed from the grid, cleaner energy sources would
quite likely replace it (at a somewhat but not astronomically higher
cost).157
Accordingly, we believe that most classical liberals will accept the
argument for Pigouvian taxation at some level. A second
counterargument would accept the desirability of a Pigouvian tax but
question why the revenues should be distributed on a per-capita basis.
Why not distribute the revenues to the particular individuals harmed by
pollution? Again, this rejoinder will be more persuasive in some
contexts than in others. With respect to carbon, for instance, a strong
argument might be made that all are harmed and so all deserve a share
of the revenues that Pigouvian taxation raises. Moreover, redistribution
targeted at the victims of pollution might engender moral hazard, with
individuals having an incentive to locate themselves near the site of the
harm.
Third and finally, one might argue that the revenues from
Pigouvian taxation should be allocated first to cover the costs of the
existing state, before any further redistribution occurs. This
prioritization of payments would drastically reduce and likely exhaust
the amount available for redistribution. This last point is perhaps the
strongest rejoinder to the classical liberal argument for broad-based
redistribution funded from Pigouvian taxation. A full-throated classical
liberal case for broad-based redistribution as a mechanism for allocating
the revenue from a Pigouvian tax on environmental externalities would
require an additional argument as to why redistribution should take
precedence over other governmental spending priorities.
In sum, broad-based redistribution might be justified as one leg of
a policy combining Pigouvian taxation with per capita redistribution of
157. See Mark Z. Jacobson & Mark A. Delucchi, A Plan to Power 100 Percent
of
the
Planet
with
Renewables,
SCI.
AM.
(Nov.
2009),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-path-to-sustainable-energy-by-2030
[https://perma.cc/97NJ-5ARV].
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revenues, but the justification is far from unassailable. We view this
version of the classical liberal case for redistribution as perhaps the
weakest of the arguments we have surveyed. Classical liberal
arguments aimed directly at supporting a safety net—either on publicgood grounds or on grounds that the state must be justifiable to all—are
more likely to support a program of redistribution.
III. WHY A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IN THE FORM OF CASH?
Part II considered the case for limited redistribution on libertarian
grounds. We have said little thus far about the form that such
redistribution might take. Here we consider how libertarianism might
shed light on important design details, including (1) whether transfers
should be in cash or in-kind; (2) whether such transfers should be
conditional or universal; and (3) whether such transfers should be onetime or periodic.
A. The Case for Periodic Unconditional Cash Transfers
1. IN CASH VS. IN-KIND
a. The Case for Cash
A defining feature of a universal basic income is that it comes in
cash rather than in-kind. Libertarians will generally prefer cash transfer
schemes rather than in-kind programs on the grounds that cash transfers
promote recipients’ autonomy and self-ownership, whereas in-kind
transfers exemplify the type of paternalism that libertarianism abhors.
In-kind transfers (at least arguably) imply a lack of trust in recipients to
make decisions about what would best further their pursuit of their life
goals, as well as implying value judgments about what recipients
“should” and “should not” spend money on. In contrast, cash transfers
allow individuals to decide for themselves what would be best for them.
Recipients decide how much to allocate toward food versus clothing
versus child care versus other uses. Libertarianism generally implies a
respect for individual autonomy and self-ownership, with an
accompanying suspicion of government interference in decisions about
how to live one’s life. For this reason, we might expect that libertarians
who support some amount of redistribution will want that redistribution
to come in cash.
Aside from arguments based on autonomy and self-ownership, we
believe there are pragmatic reasons to favor cash transfers as well. The
pragmatic case for a UBI generally stems from its efficiency advantages
when compared to in-kind benefits. First, implementing a UBI in lieu
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of the current maze of overlapping welfare programs will likely reduce
the size and expense of government bureaucracy. To illustrate: Four
different cabinet departments—including the Department of Energy—
operate thirty-three different housing programs.158 Three cabinet
departments and one independent agency operate twenty-one food or
food-purchasing assistance programs.159 Twenty-seven cash or generalassistance programs are run by six different cabinet departments and
five other independent agencies.160 Replacing this array of programs
with one streamlined program run by one agency would presumably
reduce administrative and overhead costs. While the administrative
costs for the programs just mentioned are fairly modest—generally
under five percent of total costs161—the administrative costs of cash
transfers are considerably lower. Social Security provides cash
payments at an administrative cost of less than eight tenths of one
percent.162 In 2013, for example, it paid out benefits totaling roughly
$812 billion while spending only $6.2 billion on administrative and
overhead costs.163 Channeling redistribution through the Social Security
Administration—likely the agency best equipped to implement a UBI—
would almost certainly increase the benefits received per tax dollar
spent. There will only be one agency with one set of overhead costs,
instead of multiple agencies with multiple levels of bureaucracy.
Second, cash transfer programs avoid recipient-level inefficiencies
associated with in-kind benefit programs. To illustrate: Individuals with
preferences that do not match the state’s preferences may find ways to
turn in-kind benefits into cash. Reports of a soda “black market” in
rural Appalachia reflect this concern. According to Kevin Williamson,
some recipients of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
benefits buy large quantities of soda that they then resell for cash at
steeply discounted values—as much as fifty cents on the dollar,
meaning that they have given up, say, $400 of in-kind benefits for $200
cash.164 For these individuals, asserting their autonomy comes at a steep
price; there is also a cost to the government in that half the value of the
benefits have been captured by black market soda purchasers who are
not the target beneficiaries. Moreover, consolidating the work of
158. Michael Tanner, The Pros and Cons of a Guaranteed National Income,
CATO INST., May 12, 2015, at 1, 7.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Kevin D. Williamson, The White Ghetto, NAT’L REV., Jan. 9, 2014,
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/367903/white-ghetto-kevin-d-williamson
[https://perma.cc/BN3D-2Y5J].
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numerous agencies into one means that recipients will no longer have to
spend time and energy navigating multiple welfare programs, each with
their own forms, many requiring office visits, and which often have
conflicting eligibility requirements.165 Reducing the cost to beneficiaries
leaves them more time for work or family.
b. Potential Counterarguments
Although we believe both the normative autonomy and pragmatic
efficiency arguments just discussed to be generally correct, we
acknowledge several potential counterarguments. Consider first the
argument that cash is more efficient because of the deadweight loss
associated with in-kind benefits: While it might be relatively easy for
SNAP beneficiaries to exchange food stamps for cash, it is much more
difficult for a Medicaid beneficiary to sell his benefits on a secondary
market. Thus, the pragmatic argument for cash transfers based on
convertibility only goes so far.
Moreover, there are, pragmatic non-paternalistic reasons why the
state may decide to provide benefits in-kind rather than in cash. First,
the state may enjoy an advantage relative to the free market in
providing a particular good or service. Studies suggest that Medicaid
provides access to health care services that is comparable in quality to
private market options at a much lower cost.166 One might imagine that
the government enjoys scale economy advantages in providing meals to
low-income students through the National School Lunch Program,
though it is not obvious that this is the case.167 This cost-advantage
argument does not apply to all in-kind transfers: for example, SNAP
recipients generally use their benefits to buy food from private-sector
vendors at private-sector prices, and Section 8 voucher recipients
generally rent from private-sector landlords as well. Even so,
libertarians who reject paternalistic arguments for in-kind redistribution
might nonetheless favor in-kind benefits if and when the state enjoys a
cost advantage vis-à-vis the private market.

165. Tanner, supra note 158, at 7–8.
166. See Teresa A. Coughlin et al., What Difference Does Medicaid Make?
Assessing Cost Effectiveness, Access, and Financial Protection under Medicaid for
Low-Income
Adults,
KFF.ORG
(May
2013),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/8440-what-difference-doesmedicaid-make2.pdf [https://perma.cc/697L-8BJN].
167. On the relative costs of subsidized and paid lunches, see Zoe Neuberger &
Tina Fritz Namian, Who Benefits from Federal Subsidies for Free and Reduced Price
School Meals?, CTR. FOR BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Jan. 30, 2010),
http://www.cbpp.org/research/who-benefits-from-federal-subsidies-for-free-andreduced-price-school-meals [https://perma.cc/PSN7-UFAV].
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Second, reliance on in-kind benefits may serve a screening
function, which is relevant if the ideal UBI would be targeted only to
those who are unable to support themselves through no fault of their
own. Accepting that starting point, assume that the state also lacks the
ability to distinguish the involuntarily unemployed from those who
choose not to work. Suppose, moreover, that in-kind benefits (a) are of
lower quality than those that can be purchased, and/or (b) come with a
certain amount of stigma. The involuntarily unemployed may choose to
accept the lower quality goods and the associated stigma, while the
voluntarily unemployed might decide that they would prefer to work so
that they can afford higher quality goods without any stigma attached.
Quality and stigma potentially accomplish what the government cannot:
they might screen out the voluntarily unemployed and increase the
likelihood that the benefits of redistribution flow to the intended
beneficiaries only.168 Along the same lines, the effort necessary to
obtain benefits by applying to multiple agencies might serve a similar
screening function. The hassle of dealing with multiple application
processes may discourage those who do not truly need assistance from
applying.
The argument for in-kind benefits as a screening mechanism is
highly speculative. Note that if the provision of benefits in-kind fails to
reduce take-up among the voluntarily unemployed, then the lower
quality and associated stigma represent pure social costs. Moreover, it
is far from clear that the hurdles of obtaining in-kind benefits will serve
an effective screening function: these hurdles may, for instance,
preclude those who are least able to fend for themselves in the job
market from obtaining benefits, while those who are better able to
navigate the bureaucracy (and perhaps, therefore, the labor market) do
acquire aid. For these reasons, we expect that the autonomy argument
in favor of cash benefits will trump the uncertain screening argument
for in-kind benefits in the minds of most libertarians. And yet we
should be careful before rejecting in-kind redistribution out of hand.
Libertarians who believe in a minimal safety net still will generally
think that the safety net should be provided at minimum cost. Even if
some taxation can be justified on libertarian premises, limiting the cost
of redistribution and thus the amount of taxation remains a libertarian
desideratum. Libertarians therefore need to weigh the autonomy
arguments for cash transfers against whatever screening benefits and
efficiencies of scale might be generated by an in-kind system.

168. For a similar argument focusing on quality (without consideration of
stigma), see Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Public Provision of Private Goods and
the Redistribution of Income, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 979 (1991).
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The further potential argument for in-kind transfers springs,
somewhat surprisingly, from the classical liberal case for redistribution
as a public good. Recall that Milton Friedman’s argument for
redistribution as a public good depends on the preferences of the
transferor, not the transferee. “I am distressed by the sight of poverty,”
Friedman’s argument begins.169 What if non-poor members of society
are distressed by visible manifestations of poverty—starvation, disease,
homelessness—but not by the fact that low-income individuals lack the
resources to pursue their own life goals? From the perspective of the
non-poor, redistribution in-kind might mitigate distress just as well as
redistribution in the form of cash. Indeed, we can take the argument a
step further and imagine that the Friedmans are distressed by the sight
of poor people living in substandard housing even when the individuals
living in substandard housing would prefer to spend their money on
other things. Under these circumstances, alleviation of visible
manifestations of poverty might be a public good even though
redistribution in the form of cash is not.
Libertarians might hope, of course, that the non-poor members of
society—the Friedmans—will themselves be libertarians who respect the
autonomy and self-ownership of the poorer members of society who
benefit from redistribution. If everyone thinks like libertarians do (and,
indeed, like Friedman did), then the case for redistribution in cash
would be much easier. The difficulty with the classical liberal argument
for redistribution as a public good is that it depends on the actual
preferences of the non-poor, which may or may not align with the
preferences that libertarians might wish the non-poor to have.
In all likelihood, the non-poor will have a range of preferences, as
with our example of Friedman, Scrooge, and Leona above. Friedman is
willing to contribute to the relief of poverty through cash transfers
provided everyone else does; Scrooge is unwilling to contribute at all;
Leona prefers transfers only to Maltese dogs; and a fourth individual,
Jamie, is willing to contribute to the provision of fresh fruits and
vegetables for the poor provided that everyone else does. Jamie does
not support a cash transfer to the poor because he fears that they will
use the money to buy soda and chips. From Jamie’s perspective, inkind transfers are a public good but cash transfers are not.170 Again, if
169. FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 191 (emphasis added).
170. With apologies to the British celebrity chef. Cf. David Millward, Jamie
Oliver Sparks Poverty Row After He Attacks Families for Eating Junk Food and Buying
Expensive
TV
Sets,
TELEGRAPH
(Aug.
27,
2013,
11:28
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celebritynews/10266648/Jamie-Oliver-sparkspoverty-row-after-he-attacks-families-for-eating-junk-food-and-buying-expensive-TVsets.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208181700/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/celeb
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the provision of public goods by the classical liberal state is subject to a
heckler’s veto, no amount of redistribution occurs. If the provision of
public goods by the classical liberal state is determined on the basis of a
majoritarian or super-majoritarian voting rule, then the outcome
depends upon the frequency of Friedmans, Scrooges, Leonas, and
Jamies in the general population. Friedman can, of course, try to
convince his compatriots that cash transfers are preferable for all the
reasons mentioned above. We then reach the peculiar conclusion that
the persuasiveness of one classical liberal case for redistribution in the
form of cash depends on the persuasiveness of the classical liberal case
for redistribution in the form of cash.
2. UNIVERSAL VS. CONDITIONAL
We have so far considered whether libertarian arguments for
redistribution support redistribution in the form of cash. A second
feature of a UBI is that it is universal. Providing a universal basic
income to all, regardless of ability or willingness to work, reflects
libertarian ideals by minimizing governmental invasiveness and
removing the possibility of governmental error. Here, we explain the
basis for this conclusion and consider potential objections.
Recall that some of the theoretical justifications for limited
redistribution discussed above rest on the premise that certain
individuals, through no fault of their own, cannot obtain the basic
necessities for survival. This is particularly true of the arguments
arising from minimal state libertarian commitments. A basic safety net
serves to absolutize private property rights by removing a “life-saving
necessity” justification for incursions on those rights and to assure that
some individuals are not made worse off by the private appropriation of
property. These arguments support redistribution to those faultlessly in
need but do not countenance redistribution to those who are able to
work for a living but choose not to.171 Such individuals neither need to
violate others’ rights to preserve their own lives, nor are they made
worse off by others’ appropriation: before appropriation, such
individuals had to expend their own labor for sustenance (be it to gather
apples, or fish, or hunt), and the same holds true after.
In theory, then, a safety net would be limited to those who are
unable to work through no fault of their own, or some type of workfare
requirement would be imposed on those who are capable of work.
Distinguishing among these two groups, however, is both error-prone
ritynews/10266648/Jamie-Oliver-sparks-poverty-row-after-he-attacks-families-foreating-junk-food-and-buying-expensive-TV-sets.html].
171. See Zwolinski, Property Rights, supra note 85, at 525.
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and intrusive. Consider all the information the government would need
to determine if someone was poor through no fault of their own or not,
such as how hard they have tried to look for work and whether they
have wasted any money they might have had.172 As Matt Zwolinski has
noted:
When a person shows up to file a claim for benefits because
he lost his job and can no longer afford to feed his family,
how is the bureaucrat in charge of his case supposed to
determine whether his misfortune is due to poor choices, poor
luck, or an unjust restriction of his opportunities? . . . .
Distinguishing between the deserving and undeserving is
difficult business and requires a variety of invasive,
demoralizing, and degrading inspections into the intimate
details of applicants’ lives. “Fill out this form, tell us about
that man you live with, pee in this cup, and submit to spot
inspections of your home by our social workers—or else.”173
Some might respond that the dehumanization associated with the
filing of a claim for benefits is the price such individuals must pay to
obtain state support. Our discussion of stigma above becomes relevant
again here. On the one hand, the demoralization involved in meanstesting may serve a valuable screening mechanism; on the other hand,
the demoralization itself is a social cost. A separate concern is that
officials charged with making these distinctions will inevitably bring
their own biases and value judgments to the process. This will result in
uneven implementation, in tension with the rule of law and potentially
to the disadvantage of those already most disadvantaged by widespread
implicit and explicit biases. Relatedly, the success of individuals in
convincing government officials that they are unable to work may turn
on factors that are orthogonal to work ability. Or, worse yet, the
individuals who succeed in persuading officials of their inability might
be the ones who are in fact most capable of work.174
Lastly and most importantly, even perfectly objective state actors
will make mistakes about who is and is not deserving—presumably in
both directions. Aid will be mistakenly given to some individuals who
can work and mistakenly withheld from some who are unable to do so.
172. Zwolinski, Basic Income, supra note 8, at 8–9.
173. Zwolinski, Property Rights, supra note 85, at 525–26.
174. As James Greiner and Cassandra Pattanayak suggest, benefit claimants
who succeed in enlisting legal aid might be “disproportionately worldly.” See D. James
Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance:
What Difference Does Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J.
2118, 2192 (2012).
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These government errors mean that even with a basic income, there
will remain some number of individuals who will either: (1) have a
justification rooted in self-preservation to infringe upon others’ property
rights; (2) be made worse off by the private appropriation of property,
rendering the Lockean proviso unfulfilled; or (3) be unwilling to
consent to the exchange of liberty for the state. The inevitable existence
of error, therefore, means that unless the basic income is made
universal, it will not fulfill its role as absolutizing and legitimizing
property rights.
3. PERIODIC VS. LUMP SUM
A final defining feature of a UBI is that it is periodic. In this
respect, a UBI differs from the one-time payment proposed by Paine175
and from the more recent call by Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott for
“stakeholder grants.”176 Recall that Paine proposed to pay fifteen
pounds sterling to each adult at age twenty-one. Ackerman and Alstott
suggest a grant of $80,000 paid to young adults in four installments
from age twenty-one to age twenty-four.177 Upon first glance, these
proposals seem quite different from a monthly or annual payment that
continues over the course of a lifetime. Upon further inspection, the
difference becomes much less dramatic.
Against a backdrop of freedom of contract, a lump sum payment
can be transformed into a series of periodic payments, and a series of
periodic payments can be transformed into a lump sum. The conversion
from lump sum to periodic payments is straightforward: buy an
annuity. The conversion in the other direction involves a loan and a life
insurance policy. To elaborate—assume that the UBI is $10,000 per
year, the interest rate is five percent, and Igor desires to transform his
UBI into a lump sum. Igor can borrow $200,000 from Bank and use his
UBI to meet the interest payments. Of course, Bank will also want to
guarantee repayment of principal, and so presumably it will require
Igor to purchase a single-premium whole life insurance policy naming
Bank as beneficiary. Igor thus receives a lump sum equal to $200,000
minus the cost of the life insurance policy. We anticipate that if a UBI
were implemented, financial institutions would come to offer an even
more explicit UBI-to-lump-sum conversion product that would allow
Igor to accomplish the conversion with one transaction rather than two.
For a thirty-one year old male living in Illinois and in good health, a
single-premium whole life insurance policy from State Farm with a
175.
176.
177.

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999).
Id. at 4, 51–52.

HEMEL – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1242

1/19/2018 2:50 PM

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

death benefit of $200,000 would cost approximately $55,000 as of this
writing.178 If Igor meets this description, he receives approximately
$145,000 when he transforms his UBI into a lump sum (assuming, as in
the example above, a five percent interest rate).
Ackerman and Alstott note that “basic-income proposals typically
do not allow recipients to ‘cash out’ their stream of payments by
pledging them to a bank in exchange for a big cash payment.”179 But
presumably, a state committed to libertarianism would allow a “cash
out,” based on the justice-in-transfer principle discussed above.180 The
choice between a one-time grant and a series of periodic payments
would then become a choice between two default rules, with individuals
retaining the ability to tailor their payments to their interests and
desires.
This is not to say that everyone should be indifferent between a
periodic-payment UBI and a lump sum grant. There are winners and
losers under either approach. Consider Lyndon, who has a family
history of heart disease (or any other observable indicator of shortlivedness),181 and Jimmy, who has traits indicating that he will live into
his nineties.182 If Lyndon tries to transform his basic income into a lump
sum, then the amount that he can cash out will be smaller than what
Jimmy can cash out because Lyndon has to pay more for life insurance.
On the other hand, if Lyndon tries to transform his lump sum grant to a
basic income by purchasing a life annuity, then he will receive larger
monthly or annual payments than Jimmy: the annuity provider might be
willing to pay, say, $12,000 a year for life to Lyndon but only $8,000 a
year to Jimmy given that Jimmy’s payments are likely to last longer.
More generally, a lump sum grant will be preferable to individuals who
expect shorter lives and a UBI will be preferable to individuals who
expect to live longer.
178. Life
Insurance
Quote
from
State
Farm, STATE
FARM,
https://www.statefarm.com/insurance/quotes/life-quote (select “Illinois” under “Get a
Life Quote” and hit “Go.” Then select “male” and “good” for health category; fill in
the remaining fields appropriately; enter $200,000 for “coverage amount” and select
“Get Quote”).
179. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 176, at 212.
180. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
181. See Charles McGrath, Robert Caro’s Big Dig, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr.
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/magazine/robert-caros-big-dig.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208175743/http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/15/m
agazine/robert-caros-big-dig.html (noting that Lyndon Johnson “all along predicted an
early end for himself” and died at sixty-four).
182. On Jimmy Carter’s longevity, see John Dillon, The Record-Setting ExPresidency
of
Jimmy
Carter,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
9,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-record-setting-ex-presidencyof-jimmy-carter/262143 [https://perma.cc/W8PK-CLXS].
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Our own intuition is that libertarians should have a preference for
a UBI over a lump sum grant on these grounds. Minimal state
libertarians want to ensure that Lyndon and Jimmy both have enough to
satisfy basic needs. Otherwise, Lyndon and Jimmy are (arguably)
justified in violating the private property rights of others, and private
property owners are (arguably) unjustified in stopping Lyndon and
Jimmy from doing so. Likewise, classical liberals who consider
redistribution to be a public good presumably want to ensure that
Lyndon’s and Jimmy’s basic needs will be satisfied throughout their
lives. Moreover, minimal state libertarians and classical liberals alike
want the amount of redistribution to be equal to—but not in excess of—
the amount that Lyndon and Jimmy need to live on. Let’s say that
$10,000 is the annual income sufficient to meet basic needs (the actual
amount may be more or less). And let’s say that an annuity provider
would be willing to sell Lyndon an annuity for $140,000 that yields an
annual income of $10,000 a year. A $140,000 lump sum payment to
Lyndon would thus satisfy the “equal to but not in excess of” criterion
above. Yet the same annuity provider would charge more than
$140,000 to Jimmy for the same product, given Jimmy’s longer life
expectancy. And so either we have to raise the lump sum payment
above $140,000, so that Jimmy can buy an annuity yielding sufficient
payments, or we need some mechanism for adjusting the size of the
lump sum payment to the estimated life expectancy of the recipient.
The first option seems suboptimal because it involves paying Lyndon
more than the “equal to but not in excess of” amount. The second
option seems suboptimal from a libertarian perspective as well because
it involves the government differentiating among individuals on the
basis of health status, lifestyle choices, and (perhaps) genetics.
The same dilemma does not arise if a UBI is structured as a series
of periodic payments. We can guarantee that Lyndon and Jimmy both
have the option of receiving $10,000 a year for life, without overpaying
either. Lyndon and/or Jimmy might decide to cash out and might end up
with less than $10,000 a year, but if that occurs, it will be by their own
volition.
Note that if we think society should redistribute from the lucky to
the unlucky, then we might come to the opposite conclusion. The longlived are, by most measures, luckier than the short-lived, and most of
us would prefer to be in the long-lived category. Insofar as lump sum
grants favor the shorter-lived and periodic payments favor the longerlived, then luck egalitarianism would push us in the lump sum grant
direction. Since we do not see luck egalitarianism as an inherent
element of the libertarian theories limned above, we do not think that
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the luck egalitarian argument for lump sum grants factors into the
libertarian UBI calculus.183 Those who do believe in redistribution from
the lucky to the unlucky might, however, favor a lump sum grant over
a basic income on these grounds.
B. Common Objections to the UBI
Our claim is that an unconditional, universal basic income better
serves the values of autonomy and dignity than in-kind and restricted
spending programs. To that end, our claim does not rest on empirical
evidence about what recipients do with their funds or on outcomes
related to education, health, and the like. That said, we would be
remiss in not addressing such issues.
1. WON’T PEOPLE JUST WASTE CASH?
A frequent objection to the UBI’s unconditional nature is that
recipients will waste cash transfers.184 After all, most current welfare
programs emphasize in-kind benefits or somehow limit purchases.
Housing assistance is provided in the restricted form of Section 8
vouchers or in-kind through public housing.185 Health care for the poor
is provided in-kind via Medicaid.186 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program benefits may be used only to purchase foods, and only certain
foods at that. Recipients may not purchase “food that will be eaten in
the store” or “hot foods” with their benefits, nor may they purchase
vitamins.187 Rules for Women Infants and Children (WIC) benefits are
even more restrictive.188
183. For an argument that luck egalitarianism has no place in left-libertarianism
either, see Jonathan Quong, Left-Libertarianism: Rawlsian Not Luck Egalitarian, 19 J.
POL. PHIL. 64 (2011).
184. See, e.g., Scott Goldsmith, The Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend: A Case
Study in Implementation of a Basic Income Guarantee, INST. SOC. & ECON. RES. 6
(2010),
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/bien_xiii_ak_pfd_lessons.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SD7W-S3ZP].
185. See
Find
Affordable
Rental
Housing,
USA.GOV,
https://www.usa.gov/finding-home#item-37252 [https://perma.cc/59VA-R3DU].
186. See
Benefits,
MEDICAID.GOV,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/benefits/index.html
[https://perma.cc/Q6M75DAK].
187. See Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP): Eligible Food
Items, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligible-food-items
[https://perma.cc/63A8-VH5J].
188. California, for example, publishes a seventeen page pamphlet detailing
what beneficiaries may and may not purchase with their WIC vouchers. CAL. DEP’T
PUB. HEALTH, WIC Authorized Food List Shopping Guide (Mar. 28, 2016),
https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CFH/DWICSN/CDPH%20Document%20Library/
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Even cash assistance comes with strings. Most states, for
example, provide Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
funds through electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards.189 Functionally,
EBT cards work like debit cards.190 Legally, however, both the federal
and state governments limit the places at which recipients may use these
benefits.191 Federal law prohibits their use in “liquor stores, gaming or
gambling establishments, and adult entertainment venues;” a number of
states impose additional restrictions on using benefits for tobacco,
tattoos, and body piercing.192 Kansas imposes the most prohibitions,
also forbidding the use of EBT cards at sporting events, jewelry stores,
nail salons, movie theaters, and swimming pools.193
Are such strings necessary? Our own view is that they are not.
There is little evidence that recipients of various forms of cash or cashlike aid waste their benefits. Although data concerning the uses of cash
transfers in the United States is scant, a number of studies in other
countries shed some insight into how participants in cash transfer
programs use their benefits. Most suggest that recipients do not
squander their benefits by increasing spending on alcohol, cigarettes,
and gambling.194 A recent World Bank paper, which examined nineteen
studies containing within them forty-four estimates of the relationship
between cash transfer programs and alcohol and tobacco spending,195
WICFoods/WAFLShoppingGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z55D-UQN8]. Beneficiaries
may use WIC benefits for a dozen white eggs (but not brown); these eggs cannot be
“specialty eggs, such as cage-free, organic, vitamin-enriched, pastured, low
cholesterol, or DHA-enriched.” Id. at 7. They may buy sixteen ounce blocks or rounds
of cheddar, Colby, Jack, or mozzarella; a blend of the foregoing; or individual
mozzarella sticks; but may not purchase “[a]ny other variety, size or texture”; “[d]iced,
grated, sliced, crumbled, or shredded cheese”; “[c]heese purchased from or sliced at
the deli”; “[c]heese with added ingredients, such as hot peppers or spices”; or
“[o]rganic cheese.” Id. For some categories of foods, such as cereals and yogurts,
specific brands are authorized while others are forbidden. Id. at 8, 18. (One can only
imagine the rent-seeking that occurs as food producers vie to be approved.)
189. See, e.g., Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Temporary
Assistance, OFFICIAL WEBSITE N.Y. ST., http://otda.ny.gov/programs/temporaryassistance/ [https://perma.cc/Z8GU-HCDP].
190. See, e.g., Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance, Electronic
WEBSITE
N.Y.
ST.,
Benefits
Transfer
(EBT)
Card,
OFFICIAL
http://otda.ny.gov/workingfamilies/ebt/ [https://perma.cc/GB2V-RXMK].
191. See, e.g., Reporting Fraud, DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS
http://www.dss.state.la.us/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=135
[https://perma.cc/9MAD-628K].
192. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-709(b)(14) (2017).
193. Id.
194. David K. Evans & Anna Popova, Cash Transfers and Temptation Goods:
A Review of Global Evidence 3 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No.
6886, 2014).
195. Id.
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concluded that “[a]lmost without exception, studies find either no
significant impact or a significant negative impact of transfers on
temptation goods.”196
Instead of wasting money, recipients tend to either increase
spending on food, education, and health or make capital investments
such as livestock or replacing thatched roofs with iron roofs.197 Often,
this increased spending translates into better health outcomes. A study
of GiveDirectly’s program in Kenya found, for example, that transfers
lead to large reductions in child hunger.198 A study in Zambia found
that cash transfer recipients increased their consumption of foods
containing vitamins and protein, such as fruits, vegetables, fish, and
meat.199
The poor in the developing world, of course, face very different
circumstances than those in the United States.200 That said, there is
reason to believe that the underlying findings—that individuals
generally make productive use of the funds instead of spending them on
gambling, drugs, and alcohol—translate to the United States. One study
tracked American Indian and non-native households in North Carolina
before and after a casino opened on an Eastern Cherokee reservation;
after the casino opened, each American Indian household received an
average transfer of $4,000 per year paid from casino profits.201 The
study found that children in households receiving transfers had higher
levels of educational attainment: the $4,000 annual transfer to each
household correlated with one additional year of schooling for each
child.202 The same study also found a lower incidence of criminal
behavior among children in households receiving transfers, with no

196. Id. at abstract.
197. See, e.g., Johannes Haushofer & Jeremy Shapiro, Policy Brief: Impacts of
Unconditional
Cash
Transfers
2–3
(2013),
https://www.princeton.edu/~joha/publications/Haushofer_Shapiro_Policy_Brief_2013.
pdf [https://perma.cc/BDJ7-JZ6C]; See also Esther Schuering, Social Cash Transfers in
Zambia: A Work in Progress, POVERTY FOCUS, Aug. 2008, at 20, 20.
198. Haushofer & Shapiro, supra note 197, at 17–18.
199. Schuering, supra note 197.
200. Most cash programs in developing countries specifically allow recipients
to invest in livestock or micro-business development. In contrast, most current
governmental aid programs in the U.S. implicitly discourage investment by imposing
not only income but wealth limits in order to qualify for benefits. See, e.g.,
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) Eligibility, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
https://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility#Resources [https://perma.cc/YY3U-FHHW].
201. Randall K. Q. Akee et al., Parents' Incomes and Children's Outcomes: A
Quasi-Experiment Using Transfer Payments from Casino Profits, AM. ECON. J.:
APPLIED ECON., Jan. 2010, at 86, 86–91.
202. Id. at 90.
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effect on parents’ labor force participation.203 Another study of EITC
recipients found that a $1,000 increase in family income was associated
with a six percent increase in child math and reading scores.204 These
studies point to a conclusion that might already seem intuitive to many
readers: giving cash to families makes them better off in measurable
ways.
Moreover, while cash transfers appear to make households better
off even when the transfers come with no strings attached, strings
themselves impose a variety of costs. Drawing lines between acceptable
and unacceptable purchases is difficult, often leading to distinctions that
strike many as arbitrary.205 Even where suitable definitions can be
formulated, restrictions create an additional set of costs—for agencies
that enforce these rules, for vendors who must comply with them, and
for recipients who face the stigma associated with in-kind benefits.
These costs might be justifiable if the benefits of restricted rather than
cash transfers were real. But otherwise, they amount to deadweight
loss. At the very least, the additional costs of in-kind and restricted
transfers shift the justificatory burden away from those who believe that
low-income households will make good use of cash and onto those who
believe the opposite.
2. WHAT ABOUT CHILDREN?
A somewhat related objection is that parents who suffer from
addiction or mental illness—or otherwise exhibit behavior that might be
characterized as negligent—will waste their children’s UBI on
themselves instead of using it to benefit their children.206 A parent
might, some fear, spend money on drugs instead of safe housing or
basic necessities, resulting in ill-clothed, hungry children who live in
unsafe conditions. Arguably, the in-kind nature of, say, public housing
or food stamps assures that at least some benefits reach children.
We believe this fear is overblown for two reasons. As an initial
matter, we note that implementing a UBI does not do away with the
current legal system that addresses (even if imperfectly) child abuse and
203. See id. at 86, 90.
204. See Gordon B. Dahl & Lance Lochner, The Impact of Family Income on
Child Achievement: Evidence from the Earned Income Tax Credit, 102 AM. ECON. REV.
1927, 1930 (2012).
205. SNAP, for example, covers food but not vitamins. See Snap: Eligible
Food Items, supra note 187. As a result, recipients may use SNAP benefits to purchase
energy drinks that have a nutrition label (and are therefore “food”), but not energy
drinks that have a supplement facts label (and are therefore “vitamins”).
206. For further discussion of the place for children in a UBI, see infra Section
IV.A.1.
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neglect. With or without a UBI, a legal system will still exist that can
remove a neglected or abused child from unsafe conditions. Second,
many current assistance programs have hurdles that preclude the
neediest families from participating. Drug-addicted or mentally ill
parents who are unable to hold a job will not benefit from programs
such as the EITC that are tied to work. A number of states already
impose restrictions related to drug and alcohol abuse or past criminal
activity on participation in TANF, SNAP or housing aid programs, thus
shutting out many drug users.207 To illustrate, almost half the states
drug test TANF applicants in certain circumstances (usually those with
past drug convictions or upon reasonable suspicion of drug abuse). Ten
states permanently ban convicted drug felons from TANF, and twentyseven others have non-lifetime restrictions on TANF participation by
drug felons.208 And many programs—such as housing assistance—
require cumbersome application procedures that often effectively screen
out those suffering from substance abuse and mental illness. It is thus
quite plausible that many current programs effectively exclude the
children of such parents. For these children, something is better than
nothing, and it is hard to see how such children would be worse off
under a UBI than the current system.209
3. WON’T LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUALS JUST STOP WORKING?
A third objection to a UBI is that recipients will reduce work effort
or drop out of the labor force altogether. A UBI may affect labor output
through two channels: an income effect and a substitution effect. The
income effect arises if leisure is a normal good (i.e., a good the
consumption of which increases as income increases). If so, individuals
whose overall income increases due to a UBI would consume more
leisure (that is, work less), while individuals whose overall income
decreases would consume less leisure and work more. The substitution
effect arises if a UBI alters the opportunity cost of labor.210 In this case,
if higher taxes make work relatively more expensive, and leisure
relatively less expensive, individuals will work less. We think the
income effect concern is often overstated. The substitution effect
concern is a real one but is not specific to low-income individuals; any

207. Id.
208. Id. at 8–9.
209. This response also applies to those concerned that a UBI might harm drugaddicted or mentally ill adults when compared to in-kind benefits. For the reasons just
discussed, we doubt that a UBI would provide less aid to such individuals.
210. On income vs. substitution effects, see GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR
ECONOMICS 35–39 (7th ed. 2016).
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scheme of redistribution from high-income to low-income individuals
and households will reduce labor output through a substitution-effect
channel.
Starting with the income effect: We begin by emphasizing that a
UBI founded on libertarian principles would be sufficientarian, not
extraordinarily generous. Murray contemplates an annual UBI of
$10,000 plus another $3,000 that must be allocated for health care;211
below we discuss a UBI of a similar magnitude. Will low-income
individuals decide that they would prefer to live on $10,000 a year
rather than work? Intuition and empirical evidence suggest not. For the
intuition, consider the fact that as of this writing, a twenty-seven yearold male in California can, for approximately $212,000, purchase an
annuity that will pay $10,000 a year for the rest of his life.212 (The
figure does not vary dramatically across states.)213 Also, consider the
fact that a number of top national law firms pay their associates a
starting salary of $180,000 a year.214 With less than two years of work
(taking into account taxes), a law firm associate would earn enough to
be able to retire on $10,000 a year for life. Next, ask yourself how
many newly-minted law school graduates have a life plan that includes
working for less than two years and then retiring on a $10,000 annual
income. The set might not be empty, but it is certainly not full. The
prospect of a $10,000 annual income does not seem sufficient to spur
exit from the workforce.
If the argument based on intuition is not persuasive, consider the
empirical evidence. As noted above, adults in American Indian
households in North Carolina did not measurably reduce their labor
output once they began receiving $4,000 a year from casino profits.215
Concededly, a sufficientarian UBI might be larger than that on a perhousehold basis, and so a forecast based on the North Carolina
experience would be out of sample. Even so, what we can say is that
we have little reason to believe on the basis of intuition or evidence that
a UBI in the $10,000 a year range would lead to a large-scale exit from
the workforce due to an income effect.

211. See MURRAY, supra note 4, at 7.
212. See
Income
Annuity
Estimator,
CHARLES
SCHWAB,
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/investing/accounts_products/investment/annuiti
es/income_annuity/fixed_income_annuity_calculator [https://perma.cc/WZR8-AA8U].
213. Id.
214. See Staci Zaretsky, Salary Wars Scorecard: Which Firms Have Announced
Raises?,
ABOVE
LAW
(June
13,
2016,
10:38
AM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/06/salary-wars-scorecard-which-firms-have-announcedraises [https://perma.cc/B7WU-HZCA].
215. See Akee et al., supra note 201, at 91–92.
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Exiting the workforce altogether, however, is only one possible
response to the income effect. Labor supply adjustments can occur on
two margins: an intensive margin and an extensive margin. The
intensive margin refers to the decision about how many hours to work;
the extensive margin refers to the decision whether to participate in the
labor force at all.216 Many low-income individuals do not have a choice
as to how many hours they log; they work as much (or as little) as their
boss orders. Even if the income effect of a UBI did motivate lowincome individuals to work less, many would not have the option of
adjusting labor output on the intensive margin, and we expect that
relatively few would respond with a more drastic extensive margin
adjustment (i.e., exit from the workforce altogether).
Furthermore, it is unclear how the overall income effect of a UBI
compares to those of existing transfer programs. According to one
study, parents in thirty-five states already can receive more in
government benefits than they could earn at a minimum-wage job; in
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, Vermont, and Washington D.C., one can potentially collect
more in benefits than one can earn at a job paying twenty dollars an
hour.217 To be sure, many low-income individuals and families do not
qualify for many of these programs, and so stand to receive much less
under the status quo than these calculations contemplate. Our point is
simply that switching from the status quo to a UBI will raise incomes
for some households (and so reduce labor output, assuming leisure is a
normal good), while at the same time lowering incomes for other
households (and so increase labor output).
Finally, remember that in any redistributive scheme there are net
payors and net payees. Transfer payments funded through taxation
reduce the after-tax income of the rich just as they increase the after-tax
income of the poor. Focusing solely on the income effect channel, we
would expect that introducing a redistributive scheme causes the rich to
work more than before and causes the poor to work less. Which of
these effects predominates is ambiguous theoretically and difficult to
discern empirically, because the income effect generally operates at the
same time as a substitution effect.
Turning to the substitution effect: We have acknowledged from the
start that a UBI requires higher marginal tax rates relative to a world
without a UBI. Whether these higher marginal tax rates fall on the rich
or the poor (or both) is a design choice; either way, we expect that
216. See Raj Chetty et al., Are Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities
Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and Extensive Margins, 101 AM.
ECON. REV. 471, 471 (2011).
217. Tanner, supra note 160, at 11.
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higher marginal tax rates will have some negative effect on work effort.
How large the effect is depends, of course, on how large the increase to
marginal tax rates is, which—in turn—depends upon the size of the
UBI. We return to this question in Section IV.B.
As an initial matter, we emphasize that the current system of
transfers likely leads to a reduction in labor output through the
substitution effect. Many existing programs for the poor phase out with
income, and these phase outs essentially act as taxes.218 To illustrate, a
food assistance program in which benefits are reduced by fifty cents for
each dollar of additional income contains an implicit fifty percent tax.
These implicit taxes generate their own work disincentives. On the
other hand, the EITC and the child tax credit rise with earned income
(to a point), offsetting some of these phase outs.219 The result is an
extraordinarily complicated schedule of real marginal rates that depends
upon which programs a household is receiving. A tenth of households
who fall between one and one-and-a-half times the federal poverty line
end up with marginal tax rates above sixty-five percent.220 The median
marginal rate for households in that income band is thirty-four
percent.221 All this makes it hard to predict how low-income individuals
might adjust work effort under a UBI of say, $10,000 coupled with tax
rates of thirty to forty percent, as compared to the current system. We
believe, however, that a UBI plausibly would lead to less distortion of
labor decisions than the status quo.222
For present purposes, we emphasize three points. First, a
reduction in labor output is not necessarily a reduction in social
welfare. It may actually be beneficial if over-worked parents are able to
replace some paid work outside the home with more family-oriented
work. Consider the myriad stories of single mothers who must work
multiple jobs to make ends meet while relying on unstable child care
situations. More time at home with children allows parents more time
to spend developing their children’s human capital, for example, by

218. Id. at 17; see also Daniel N. Shaviro, Effective Marginal Tax Rates on
Low-Income Households, EMP’T POLICIES INST. 3, 11 (Feb. 1999),
https://www.epionline.org/wp-content/studies/shaviro_02-1999.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JK2X-AY3G].
219. Tanner, supra note 160, at 17; see also Shaviro, supra note 218, at 11.
220. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES FOR LOWAND MODERATE-INCOME WORKERS IN 2016, at 8 (Nov. 2015).
221. Id. at 6–7.
222. Moreover, a UBI addresses one flaw in the current system: benefits tied to
work, such as the EITC, currently provide less aid to individuals during general
recessionary times when employers cut jobs and hours. See Kerry A. Ryan, EITC as
Income (In)Stability?, 15 FLA. TAX REV. 583 (2014). And it is precisely when
employers make such cuts that low-income workers need more assistance.
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reading to them, having dinner together, playing games, and so on.
Recalled one researcher about the effects of earlier experiments in the
United States, “Some of [the work response] came from cutting down
hours, say from sixty-five to sixty hours a week, which doesn’t seem
like a tragedy.”223
Second, evaluating the income and substitution effects of a UBI
requires a specification of the baseline. If the baseline is a world with
no redistribution, then the income and substitution effects look more
significant; if the baseline is the status quo, then the effects are less
dramatic. Insofar as we argue that a UBI is a libertarian first-best, then
our justificatory burden is to show that from a libertarian perspective a
UBI is preferable even to a redistribution-free state. The comparison to
the status quo becomes more relevant when evaluating the UBI as a
change from current policy rather than as an ideal.
Third, ultimately some bullets must be bitten. By this, we mean
that any society must choose between a world with no redistribution
and a world in which redistribution reduces labor output through a
substitution effect. We have argued that the first option is likely
undesirable for minimal state libertarians and intolerable from a
classical liberal perspective. This suggests that a basic income should
be designed to minimize the negative consequences of second option.
We think that a UBI scheme can be crafted so that the negative effects
on labor output are limited (though not eliminated). But the devil is in
the details, to which we now turn.
IV. DESIGN DETAILS
So far we have set out the argument for a basic income—not
conditional on work or inability to work—paid in the form of cash on a
periodic basis. In this Part, we discuss further details of a UBI. While
the primary objective of this Article is theoretical, we believe that the
theory underlying a UBI should also inform the implementation of a
UBI. Here, we focus on four important elements of a basic income
scheme: (1) to whom should a basic income be paid?; (2) how large
should the basic income be?; (3) how much would various options cost
and what existing programs might a UBI replace?; and (4) should the
basic income amount phase out as market income rises?

223. ROBERT A. LEVINE ET AL., A Retrospective on the Negative Income Tax
Experiments, in THE ETHICS AND ECONOMICS OF THE BASIC INCOME GUARANTEE 95, 99
(2005).
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A. Who Should Receive a Basic Income?
The “who” question has many components, two of which we focus
on here. First, should the basic income extend to children? Second,
should the basic income extend to noncitizens? While we offer tentative
answers to both questions, our broader aim is to illustrate how the
theoretical foundations for a basic income might illuminate questions of
this sort.
1. CHILDREN
Several prominent proponents of a UBI explicitly exclude children
from their proposed basic income schemes. Their reasons for doing so
are diverse. For example, former labor leader Andy Stern argues that
extending a UBI to children would introduce administrative
complications into an otherwise simple system: “just think about all the
issues that come up when you try to get your mind around giving [a
basic income] to a ten-year-old,” he writes.224 Charles Murray argues
that extending a UBI to children would encourage low-income parents
to have more children (a result that he implies is undesirable).225
We find these arguments for excluding children from a UBI to be
unpersuasive. The administrative complications of extending a UBI to
children seem minimal: we could allow parents to claim the UBI on
behalf of their children, just as we now allow parents to collect SNAP
benefits and claim tax credits on behalf of their children. Many
European countries have distributed cash benefits on a per-child basis
for years.226 As for the childbirth incentives, we see little evidence that
the implementation of a UBI would have a first-order effect on fertility
rates. Note that the existing system of tax and transfers already
encourages low-income individuals to have more children—for
example, a single individual earning $10,000 a year receives an
additional $4,000 through the EITC and child tax credit if he or she has
a child, plus potentially more through SNAP. Studies by Stephen

224.
225.
226.

STERN WITH KRAVITZ, supra note 29, at 204.
See MURRAY, supra note 4, at 44–47.
Edward Malnick, Benefits in Europe: Country by Country, TELEGRAPH
(Oct.
19,
2013,
10:08
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/10391238/Benefits-in-Europecountry-by-country.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20171208182613/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world
news/europe/10391238/Benefits-in-Europe-country-by-country.html].
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Bronars, Jeff Grogger,227 and Melissa Schettini Kearney228 find that the
incentives embedded in the existing welfare state yield only a modest
effect on fertility. And depending on the size of a UBI, a child-inclusive
basic income scheme might enhance the financial reward for having
more children only marginally, if at all.
Yet even if the arguments against extending a UBI to children are
unpersuasive, how strong are the affirmative arguments for including
children in a UBI? The answer, we believe, depends critically on the
theoretical foundations upon which a basic income might rest.
First, consider a UBI that is justified as a mechanism for
absolutizing private property rights, along the lines suggested in Section
II.A. On this view, the argument for extending a UBI to children seems
quite strong. According to Eric Mack’s argument, private property
rights are non-absolute as against individuals in positions analogous to
the “Freezing Incapable Hiker”—i.e., individuals who, through no fault
of their own, find themselves unable to survive unless they trespass on
the property of others. The minor child of a very low-income parent
would seem to meet the just-mentioned criterion: it is hard to argue that
a child born into extreme poverty is “at fault” for that fact.
A more sensitive question is whether the very low-income parent
of a minor child is also “faultless.” The answer may depend on why the
parent has failed to earn a subsistence-level income and—perhaps—
whether society should hold the parent responsible for having a child in
the first place. (The latter question will quickly ensnare us in
discussions of reproductive rights that lie well beyond the scope of this
Article.) For present purposes, we think the following claim will strike
most (though not all) readers as sound: Private property rights are
nonabsolute as against an individual who is incapable of earning a
subsistence-level income in the market and who must trespass on the
private property of others in order to provide basic necessities for his
minor child. If this is the case, then private property rights cannot be
“absolutized” simply by guaranteeing a subsistence-level income for all
adults, because an income that allows one adult to survive at a
subsistence level will not necessarily allow one adult and one or more
children to survive at a subsistence level. This would suggest a need to
increase the allowance for adults with children, at least if the objective
is to render private property rights truly absolute.

227. Jeff Groger & Stephen G. Bronars, The Effect of Welfare Payments on the
Marriage and Fertility Behavior of Unwed Mothers: Results from a Twins Experiment,
109 J. POL. ECON. 529 (2001).
228. Melissa Schettini Kearney, Is There an Effect of Incremental Welfare
Benefits on Fertility Behavior? A Look at the Family Cap, 39 J. HUMAN. RES. 295
(2004).
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If a UBI is justified on classical liberal premises, however, the
question of whether children should be included becomes more
complicated. In Section II.B, we suggested that a UBI might be justified
under classical liberalism as a public good, or as a mechanism for
procuring the (hypothetical) consent of low-endowment contracting
parties, or as a method of distributing the revenues from a Pigouvian
tax. A UBI could be a public good insofar as redistribution reduces
crime or insofar as poverty exerts an aesthetic diseconomy on other
members of society. As for the crime rationale: presumably, children
are less likely to commit crimes than adults, and so the argument that a
UBI limited to the non-incarcerated raises the price of crime carries less
force in the context of children. On the other hand, the desperate
circumstances of their children might lead parents to petty crime in
extreme cases,229 which might counsel in favor of extending the UBI to
children (and/or increasing the amount for families). Note, though, that
the larger a UBI, the larger the tax necessary to fund it, and so the
more that the tax raises the after-tax return to illicit activities relative to
licit activities (assuming, again, that illicit activities go untaxed).
Extending the UBI to children raises the cost, and thus the necessary
tax on legal market income, and thus the incentive to earn income
through illicit activity.
While justifying the extension of a UBI to children is difficult if
one proceeds on a crime-reduction premise, it is considerably easier if
we adopt the aesthetic diseconomy argument suggested by Friedman.
Recall again Friedman’s assertion that he is “distressed by the sight of
poverty” and thereby “benefited by its alleviation.”230 Presumably,
individuals who are distressed by the sight of poverty are particularly
distressed by the sight of child poverty. The public-goods argument for
alleviating adult poverty becomes even stronger then.
An alternative classical liberal route to a UBI discussed in Section
II.B hinged on the claim that a UBI allows the state to procure the
hypothetical consent of low-endowment contracting parties. Whether
such a UBI ought to include children would seem to depend on whether
children are parties to a social contract. Hilde Bojer has argued that
libertarianism “is a theory applicable to adults only.”231 She writes:
“Libertarians claim that . . . [t]he rights of the individual to
pursue his own life and to retain the fruits of his labor are
229. See, e.g., VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES 80 (Isabel F. Hapgood trans.,
Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1887) (1862).
230. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
231. Hilde Bojer, Children and Theories of Social Justice, 6 FEMINIST ECON.
23, 30 (2000).
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sacrosanct.” Substitute “child” for “individual” in the above .
. . and it reads: “The rights of the child to pursue his own life
and to retain the fruits of his labor are sacrosanct,” which is
plainly impossible.232
Others have argued that children do have a role to play in
libertarian theory. Edward Feser writes that “the mainstream (and
surely sane) libertarian view is something like this: children are selfowners, but . . . they are, in effect, ‘held in trust’ by their parents, who
act as stewards of the children’s property (i.e., themselves) until such
time as their children reach maturity.”233 The “trust” model suggests
that the offer to children under the social contract must be enough such
that parents, as fiduciaries, act in their children’s best interests by
accepting. This might suggest a lower UBI for children than for adults,
insofar as a fiduciary acting in someone else’s best interests would not
reject a low-ball offer in the Ultimatum Game.
The case for including children in a UBI is especially strong if a
UBI is the flipside of a Pigouvian tax and the goal is to compensate
pollution victims. Children presumably bear the costs of pollution to the
same extent (if not a greater extent) than adults. Again, the UBI might
flow immediately to the children’s parents or guardians, consistent with
the fiduciary model discussed above.
Our treatment of the children question is not (and not meant to be)
exhaustive. The broader point is that whether a UBI ought to include
children depends on why one thinks we ought to have a UBI in the first
place. Different strands of libertarian theory generate different
justifications for a UBI and, not surprisingly, different
recommendations regarding a UBI’s design details.
2. NONCITIZENS
In our discussion so far we have considered interpersonal and
intergenerational obligations, but not international obligations. The case
for a UBI becomes somewhat more complicated in a multi-state world.
It seems implausible that a UBI would be implemented in the
foreseeable future at a supranational level. We will restrict our analysis
to a UBI implemented by a single state—focusing here on the United
States—while also acknowledging that some arguments for a UBI might

232. Id. at 29 (quoting SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE
FAMILY 74 (1989)).
233. Edward Feser, Self-Ownership, Abortion, and the Rights of Children:
Toward a More Conservative Libertarianism, 18 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 91, 94 (2004).

HEMEL – FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2017:1189

1/19/2018 2:50 PM

Atlas Nods

1257

imply that any such basic income should be implemented on a global
scale.
Even under a single-state version of a UBI, however, the question
arises: what about noncitizens? Insofar as a UBI is justified as a means
of absolutizing private property rights, the answer seems to us
straightforward: Mack’s freezing incapable hiker has as much of a
justification to trespass if she is a foreign traveler as if she is a neighbor
out for an evening constitutional. That is, an individual who must
trespass on the property of others in order to survive has a justification
to do so regardless of her nationality. Accordingly, a basic income
would seem to achieve its absolutization function only if extended to
citizens and noncitizen residents alike.
Would this not lead millions to cross the border from Mexico in
order to set up residence in the United States and claim their UBI? The
answer depends, of course, on the size of a potential UBI—a subject we
address in Section IV.B. Beyond that, one might argue that a nationstate has the same right to exclude as a private property owner (a
right—per Mack—that justifies locking the door but not using force
against the helpless). The United States might be justified in taking
certain protective measures to keep illegal immigrants out, although the
absolutization of private property rights might still require a UBI to
extend to some who are here illegally (especially, illegally and
involuntarily—e.g., “Dreamers”).234
A classical liberal might have more success in arguing that a UBI
should be limited to citizens. Insofar as a UBI is justified as a public
good, the argument might take two paths. First, the classical liberal
might say that a UBI extended to citizens as well as noncitizens is
something like an attractive nuisance bringing immigrants into the
country. The classical liberal might argue, even on non-xenophobic
grounds, that a mass migration triggered by a truly unconditional UBI
might have disruptive consequences that make it more of a public bad
than a public good (for example, a large population influx may increase
school class sizes to an unmanageable level). Second, the classical
liberal who justifies a UBI based on the aesthetic diseconomies from
poverty might say that a UBI attracting more low-income individuals to
the country increases rather than decreases those diseconomies. This, of
course, raises the question of whether the aesthetic diseconomies of
poverty can be addressed by hiding poverty abroad rather than solving
poverty here. We might hope that the answer is “no,” but insofar as the

234. Joanna Walters, What is Daca and Who are the Dreamers?, GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/04/donald-trump-what-is-dacadreamers [https://perma.cc/QU3E-CS7W].
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aesthetic diseconomies argument depends upon the actual preferences of
individuals, we fear that the answer might indeed be “yes.”
A classical liberal also might make a contractarian case for limiting
the UBI to citizens. The argument would proceed along the following
lines: First, an international system of nation-states with control over
their own borders is justifiable on classical liberal premises. With fully
open borders, the best functioning state would be overrun by
immigrants until it could no longer function much better than the
others. Unbridled migration would serve to level down. We can
imagine the Peace of Westphalia as a sort of meta-social contract: each
nation-state in the Westphalian system achieves legitimacy so long as it
can procure the (hypothetical) consent of its members, and the
Westphalian system as a whole is legitimate as long as it can procure
the (hypothetical) consent of all member-states. On this view, the
state’s only domestic concern is to ensure that none of its own members
can reasonably reject the forced exchange.
B. How Large Should the Basic Income Be?
Basic income proposals vary not only in scope but in size. For
example, Stern’s basic income would be $1,000 per adult per month;235
Murray’s would be only modestly larger ($13,000 per adult per year,
$3,000 of which would be set aside for health care);236 Brian Barry’s
would be quite a bit larger than that (50% of average income, which
would mean a basic income of more than $27,000 per person in the
United States).237 For comparison, the 2016 official poverty threshold
was $12,486 for one individual under age sixty-five, and $24,600 for a
family of four with two children under the age of eighteen.238

235.
236.
237.

See STERN WITH KRAVITZ, supra note 29, at 201.
See MURRAY, supra note 4, at 7.
See BRIAN BARRY, CTR. FOR ANALYSIS SOC. EXCLUSION, SOCIAL
EXCLUSION, SOCIAL ISOLATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 22 (1998).
238. Poverty Thresholds for 2016 by Size of Family and Number of Related
Children
under
18
Years
(2016),
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historicalpoverty-thresholds.html [https://perma.cc/MS2K-JEP6]. The official poverty threshold
is used for statistical purposes, and does not vary by location, although it does vary by
family size and age. Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines [https://perma.cc/Z98M-MLM4]. The official
poverty guideline is used to determine eligibility for various federal programs. It varies
by family size but not age, and has different measures for Alaska and Hawaii. In 2017,
the poverty guideline in the contiguous United States is $12,060 for a single individual
and $24,600 for a family of four. Id. For critiques of these measures, see sources cited
infra note 240.
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The “how much” question (like the “to whom” question) depends
on the theoretical foundations upon which a UBI might rest. Insofar as
a UBI exists to absolutize private property rights, a basic income need
only be large enough such that no individual who receives the basic
income would have a legitimate entitlement to infringe upon the private
property of others. Presumably, this would be the amount required to
satisfy basic needs (food, clothing, shelter), and perhaps to purchase
basic healthcare as well.239 Since the cost of health insurance rises with
age (and especially so if the insurance market is deregulated), the basic
income amount might rise with age as well.
Translating these qualitative standards into quantitative ones is
difficult.240 Allocating $2 a day for food,241 $200 a month for rent, and
$200 a year for clothing brings one to $3,330, and that is without any
expenditure on health care. An unsubsidized bronze-level health
insurance plan might cost somewhere in the range from $2,500 to
$7,500 per year, depending on age.242 This back-of-the-envelope
calculation suggests that a basic income of $6,000 to $11,000 per year
might meet a sufficientarian threshold that minimal state libertarianism
likely requires. We recognize that this amount is quite meager and
allows for nothing but the bare minimum necessary for survival, but
that is arguably implicit in a UBI that is truly sufficientarian.
Answering the “how much” question from a classical liberal
perspective is more difficult, and the resulting amount might be quite a

239. Alternatively, one might imagine a UBI layered on top of a system such as
Medicaid through which the government provides basic health care for the poor, or
perhaps a UBI existing alongside a system in which individuals receive vouchers to
purchase health care on the private market. We set aside the question of how the ideal
libertarian state would deal with health care, although we expect that libertarians
generally will prefer more market-based solutions.
240. Indeed, the vast literature that discusses various approaches to measuring
poverty demonstrates this difficulty. See, e.g., PATRICIA RUGGLES, DRAWING THE LINE:
ALTERNATIVE POVERTY MEASURES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
(1990); NICHOLAS EBERSTADT, THE POVERTY OF “THE POVERTY RATE”: MEASURE AND
MISMEASURE OF WANT IN MODERN AMERICA 40–47 (2008); Anne L. Alstott, Why the
EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 285, 291–97, n.26 (2010);
Rebecca M. Blank, Presidential Address: How to Improve Poverty Measurement in the
United States, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 233 (2008); Robert Haveman, What
Does It Mean to be Poor in a Rich Society?, 26 FOCUS 81 (2009).
241. See Kathleen Elkins, I Took the ‘Elon Musk Challenge’ and Spent Only $2
a Day on Food for a Month—and It Was Easier Than I Expected, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 3,
2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-challenge-food-budget-2016-2/#iset-aside-exactly-62-the-evening-of-december-31-and-established-a-few-guidelines-forthe-month-long-challenge-1 [https://perma.cc/FWH2-GWDZ].
242. Figures are for nonsmokers in the Chicago metropolitan area. See Health
Insurance
Calculator,
KFF.ORG.,
http://kff.org/interactive/subsidy-calculator
[https://perma.cc/4WES-L48H].
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bit higher. For the classical liberal concerned about crime reduction,
the size of the ideal basic income would depend on the balancing of two
considerations: (1) the larger the UBI, the higher the price of crime
(assuming, as above, that the UBI is limited to the non-incarcerated);
(2) the larger the UBI, the higher the tax needs to be to fund a UBI,
and so the higher the return from crime relative to licit activity. For the
classical liberal concerned about the aesthetic diseconomies of poverty,
the question would be whether a critical mass is distressed by the sight
of individuals and families living on the sufficientarian bare minimum,
or whether the amount necessary to satisfy minimal state libertarians
ameliorates the distress of our hypothetical Friedmans above.
For the classical liberal who justifies a UBI on contractarian terms,
the relevant question is somewhat different: What size basic income is
necessary for all individuals to have reason to consent to a system of
private property rights? To put it in Epstein’s framework, how much of
the surplus generated by the state must be allocated to the lowendowment individual such that the low-endowment individual cannot
reasonably reject the offer. (Recall that this is not necessarily the same
as the amount that makes the classical liberal state Pareto-superior
relative to the state of nature, unless we dismiss the behavior of
individuals in the Ultimatum Game as unreasonable.) This might be
sufficientarian in nature (as Lomasky suggests),243 or it might be even
larger, but once it becomes too large, individuals at the upper end may
start withholding their consent.244
C. How Much Would a UBI Cost and What Existing Programs Would It
Replace?
Discussions of size naturally lead to questions of cost. Because the
libertarian case for a UBI assumes that it will replace existing welfare
programs, its cost will depend on what it replaces. Although we
emphasize that this Article’s goal is theoretical and that we are not
proffering our own UBI proposal, we recognize that many readers are
curious about the types of programs that a UBI might replace and what
sizes of UBI are feasible at various tax costs. The following discussion
illustrates the interaction between repealing existing programs, various
sizes of UBI, and taxes.
Assuming a UBI replaces, and not supplements, existing welfare
programs, what might such programs be? The House Budget
243. LOMASKY, Liberty and Welfare Goods, supra note 145, at 177.
244. For the classical liberal who justifies a UBI as a method of distributing
revenues from a Pigouvian tax, the size of the UBI would presumably follow from the
amount of revenues raised by the Pigouvian tax.
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Committee offers one potential starting point in a recent report on the
War on Poverty.245 That report identifies ninety-five federal programs
across eight broad areas as targeting poverty, costing a total of $799
billion annually. Although one may quibble as to whether all ninety-five
programs should count as poverty relief, most are plausible candidates.
If we cabin discussion of health care and remove the cost of Medicaid
($250 billion) and CHIP ($9 billion) from these figures, we arrive at
approximately $540 billion annually. As of this writing, the Census
Bureau estimated the United States population at approximately 325
million.246 Dividing $540 billion by 325 million yields a UBI of roughly
$1,662 per person. Adding Medicaid and CHIP back in (which is to
say, contemplating their elimination) raises the figure to $2,458.
The House Budget Committee report does not count the cost of
Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), i.e. social
security or unemployment compensation. The federal government spent
$910 billion on OASDI in fiscal year 2016 and $33 billion on
unemployment compensation.247 Eliminating those two programs and
using the funds for a UBI would raise the per capita amount by $2,902
to $5,360. To be sure, individuals who have paid into OASDI and the
unemployment compensation system over their working lives might
object on the grounds that they thought they were buying insurance,
and now the federal government is changing the terms of the deal expost. This objection is a serious one, and some libertarians might
consider it persuasive. Our argument here is not that OASDI and
unemployment insurance ought to be eliminated in order to pay for a
UBI. Our goal is simply to illustrate the monetary consequences of
doing so.
One might add to this some of the so-called “tax expenditures”
identified and estimated by the Treasury Department each year; these
are provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that, at least arguably,
function as subsidies channeled through the tax system.248 These include
the exclusion of employer contributions for medical insurance and
medical care ($216 billion for fiscal year 2016, according to Treasury’s
estimate), the preferential treatment of defined contribution and defined
benefit plans ($129 billion), the deduction for state and local personal
245. HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE, THE WAR ON POVERTY: 50 YEARS LATER
(2014), http://budget.house.gov/waronpoverty [https://perma.cc/QDU8-254M].
246. Population,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/population.html [https://perma.cc/GNN2-52MP].
247. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017-2027, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE
tbl.1–2 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52370 [https://perma.cc/XWK97HPH].
248. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES
(1985).
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income, sales, and property taxes ($87 billion), the deduction for home
mortgage interest ($75 billion), and the deduction for charitable
contributions ($58 billion).249 The tax expenditure estimates associated
with those five items, which roughly approximate revenue losses,250
total to $565 billion for fiscal year 2016, or approximately $1,738 per
person. Adding this to the earlier figure gives us a UBI of
approximately $7,098 per person.
These figures assume that all citizens, regardless of other income,
receive the UBI. As a practical matter, the middle- and upper-classes
“repay” their UBIs whenever their tax burden from earned income
exceeds the amount of the UBI. As discussed below, one could design a
UBI to phase out with income; however, such phase outs are little
different from marginal tax increases except in name. The figure here
should be viewed as the size of a UBI that could be funded without an
implicit or explicit increase in marginal rates (though eliminating the
tax expenditures above would cause some individuals to move into
higher federal income tax brackets and, in that respect, their rates
would indeed rise).
That said, funding a UBI of $10,000 per person—as many
proposals suggest—would likely require a net increase in marginal tax
rates, although such increase is likely to be lower than one might first
assume if a UBI is coupled with the elimination of some existing
programs and tax expenditures. One way of thinking about the requisite
rate increases is as follows: adjusted gross income on all individual
income tax returns for tax year 2014 was, according to IRS statistics,
$9.103 trillion.251 The figure for 2016 will presumably be higher, but
going off of the 2014 number: If we multiply the population (325
million) by $1,000 and divide by $9.103 trillion, we arrive at
approximately 3.6 percent. So a 3.6 percentage point across-the-board
tax increase applied to adjusted gross income would yield an additional
$1,000 of UBI on a static basis. Eliminating all of the above-mentioned
programs and providing a UBI of $10,000 would require an across-theboard rate increase of ten to eleven percent.252 And recall that

249. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, TAX
EXPENDITURES 40 tbl.3 (2016).
250. See Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Estimates Approximate Revenue
Estimates, 145 TAX NOTES 701 (2014).
251. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME (SOI) TAX STATS—
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS PUBLICATION 1304 tbl.1.1 (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304complete-report [https://perma.cc/F9Q9-SHNM].
252. As just discussed, a UBI of approximately $7,000 per person could be
funded simply by aggressively eliminating existing programs. The tax increase is
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eliminating means-tested programs will also have the effect of reducing
implicit marginal rates for some individuals in phase out regions,
partially or fully offsetting the work disincentive effect of an explicit
rate hike.
We acknowledge that any such tax increase across the board might
create its own set of economic distortions. Such distortions, however,
do not in and of themselves answer the question whether some
redistribution is normatively justified. Instead, they are but one factor
to be considered when determining the ideal size of that redistribution.
Moreover, these distortions are not unique to a UBI but arise whenever
taxes are increased for redistributive purposes, regardless of the form
of that redistribution.
D. Should the Basic Income Phase Out?
Our cost calculations above all assume that a basic income would
not phase out and that marginal rates would not increase to recapture
one’s UBI. Some have suggested coupling a basic income with a “phase
out” or “payback”: the amount of the grant would begin to decline once
an individual’s market income exceeded a certain threshold. Murray,
for instance, has proposed levying a surtax on earned income over
$30,000 that acts as a phase out for individuals with incomes over that
amount.253
Does libertarianism have anything to say about whether a basic
income scheme should include a phase out? We think that it does, and
that—contrary to what one might initially assume—it counsels against a
phase out provision. Whether or not libertarians think that all taxes are
theft, they surely think that hidden taxes are suspect. A phase out of the
basic income is a hidden tax. Libertarians should want the funding of a
UBI to be more transparent.
To illustrate: Imagine a system with a basic income of $10,000 and
a flat tax of thirty percent on market income. Assume, moreover, that
we add the following phase out to this simple scheme, such that each $1
of income over $30,000 leads to a ten-cent reduction in the basic

necessary to fund the additional $3,000 necessary to bring the per person UBI up to
$10,000.
253. See MURRAY, supra note 4, at 8–9. Murray’s most recent proposal levies
a gradually increasing surtax on income between $30,000 and $60,000 that would
recapture at most half of one’s grant. Id. His earlier proposal, however, proposed a full
phase out of ten cents for each dollar earned, starting at $30,000 and ending at
$130,000. See CHARLES MURRAY, IN OUR HANDS: A PLAN TO REPLACE THE WELFARE
STATE 53–54 (2006).
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income amount.254 To illustrate, consider Milton, Nancy, and Oprah.
Milton earns exactly $30,000, pays $9,000 in taxes, and receives the
full basic income of $10,000 with no phase out. Nancy earns $40,000,
pays $12,000 in taxes, and receives a basic income of $9,000 (i.e.,
$1,000 phases out).255 Oprah earns $130,000, pays $39,000 in taxes,
and receives no basic income.256
Now, consider what happens if Milton increases his market income
to $40,000. His taxes will increase by $3,000 and his basic income will
decrease by $1,000, meaning that his extra $10,000 in income yields
him only $6,000 more on net. At the end of the day, $4,000 of his
extra $10,000 goes to the government, either in the form of taxes or a
basic income payback. And that is the very definition of a forty percent
marginal tax. The same result holds if Nancy increases her market
income from $40,000 to $50,000. However, unless Milton and Nancy
have a higher degree of tax literacy than most Americans, they may
assume they are only subject to the nominal thirty percent flat tax on
their market income. By contrast, if Oprah’s earnings rise by $10,000,
the only result is that she owes an additional $3,000 in tax, since her
UBI has already fully phased-out. Our imaginary system is thus
equivalent to a system in which everyone receives a $10,000 basic
income and the tax system has three brackets: a thirty percent bracket
for income up to $30,000, a forty percent bracket for income between
$30,000 and $130,000, and a thirty percent bracket for income above
$130,000.
Our current tax code is riddled with hidden taxes like our
hypothetical UBI that begins to phase out when earned income equals
$30,000. The phase out of the earned income tax credit effectively
imposes an additional marginal tax of 21.06 percentage points on a
head of household with two children and income between $18,340 and
$45,007.257 The phase out of the child tax credit imposes an additional
marginal tax of five percentage points on a head of household with two
children and income between $75,000 and $115,000.258 The personal
254. We borrow this example from Murray, who proposed such a phase out in
the first edition of IN OUR HANDS. In the later edition, however, Murray suggested a
limiting of the phase out to half the grant amount while increasing the rate at which it
phases out. See MURRAY, supra note 253.
255. Because her income exceeds $30,000 by $10,000, Nancy’s UBI is reduced
by ($10,000)(.10), or $1,000.
256. Because Oprah’s income exceeds $30,000 by $100,000, her UBI is
reduced by ($100,000)(.10), or $10,000.
257. See 26 U.S.C. § 32(b) (2012); Kyle Pomerleau, 2017 Tax Brackets, TAX
FOUND.
(Nov.
10,
2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/2017-tax-brackets
[https://perma.cc/28EM-XLPU].
258. See § 24.
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exemption phase out imposes an additional marginal tax of
approximately 3.2 percentage points on a head of household with two
children and income between $287,650 and $412,650.259 And so on.
Implementing a basic income requires revenue from taxation. We
have argued above that minimal state libertarians and classical liberals
alike should accept some amount of redistributive taxation for a number
of reasons rooted in libertarian theory. But acceptance of taxation need
not equate with obfuscation. Phase outs hide the ball and understate the
true rate of tax applicable to those in the phase out range, who
presumably will be the poor and the near-poor.
We anticipate two potential counterarguments from phase out
defenders. The first is that even though phase outs hide the ball, a basic
income without a phase out does so as well. The former obscures the
fact that phase outs act as a tax; the latter obscures the fact that some
taxpayers essentially repay their basic incomes through taxes. The logic
of this counterargument goes as follows: Imagine that we implement a
universal basic income that does not explicitly phase out with income
(unlike the above example) and the three-bracket scheme described
above, with a thirty percent tax on income up to $30,000, a forty
percent tax from $30,000 to $130,000, and a thirty percent tax after
that. Oprah, who earns $130,000, receives a basic income of $10,000
and pays a tax of $49,000.260 But the basic income is illusory: all that is
really going on is a net tax payment of $39,000, just as in the example
with a flat tax but a UBI that phases out. Instead of a hidden tax, we
have a transfer that occurs in plain sight: a potentially salient but
economically meaningless “basic income” that is fully offset (and more)
by an even larger transfer from the individual to the government. If
Oprah thinks that she has received a basic income, then she has been
deceived by an accounting trick.
As the foregoing shows, hidden taxes are harder to track,
especially when they are cumulative. Yet this observation gives rise to
a second counterargument that phase out defenders might make:
precisely because hidden taxes are hidden, there is something to like
about them. In the context of commodity taxation, for example, Jacob
Goldin has shown that less-than-fully-salient taxes can be welfare259. See § 151(d)(3); Pomerleau, supra note 257. The 3.2 percentage point
figure is calculated as follows: For every $2,500 of income, the taxpayer loses 2
percent of his deduction for personal exemptions. The personal exemption in 2017 is
$4,050, and the hypothetical head of household in text could claim three exemptions. A
head of household with income in the relevant range would most likely fall in the 33
percent bracket. The calculation is thus:
(2% x (3 x $4,050) x 33%)/$2,500 ≈ 3.2%.
260. Her first $30,000 of income generates tax of $9,000 (at 30%) and her next
$100,000 of income generates tax of $40,000 (at 40%), for a total of $49,000.
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enhancing;261 a similar argument applies in the context of income
taxation. The idea is that income taxes distort taxpayers’ choices
between labor and leisure, and so lead to deadweight loss. But if
individuals are not fully cognizant of the tax rate they face, then the
less-than-fully-salient income tax discourages labor less than an income
tax of which individuals are entirely aware.
Libertarians might respond that encouraging labor through hidden
taxes is like tricking people into working more. And that response is
correct—or at least close to correct. More precisely, it is like tricking
people into not working less, when a rational individual with full
information might well decide to do just that. Once a tax has been
justified on libertarian grounds, it should be transparent so that
individuals can decide for themselves how to respond. Libertarians are
likely to conclude that low-salience taxes clash with their commitment
to individual autonomy, even though such taxes might enhance welfare
according to utilitarian metrics. Moreover, making the amount of
taxation transparent better enables individuals to monitor the amount of
taxation (and coercion) to which they are subject. This helps citizens
ensure that the government is not engaging in activities that cannot be
justified on libertarian or classical liberal grounds.262
V. POLITICAL ECONOMY QUESTIONS
While our analysis so far has considered both theoretical and
practical aspects of a UBI, some readers might react that the entire
analytical endeavor overlooks the utter impracticality of a UBI given
current political conditions. Whether or not grounded in libertarian
principles, isn’t talk of a UBI still pie in the sky? Section V.A
acknowledges and addresses the political challenges facing a UBI.
Section V.B considers the converse claim, advanced by Charles Murray
and others, that a UBI is the only politically practical way of
transitioning from a high-redistribution “nanny state” to a low- or nodistribution system more compatible with libertarian principles.
A. The Political Economy of a Universal Basic Income
We have noted above that a proposal for a UBI failed spectacularly
in a nationwide referendum in Switzerland in June 2016, with nearly

261. See Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience, 131 J. PUB. ECON. 115 (2015).
262. Libertarians often criticize the withholding of taxes from worker’s
paychecks for this very reason.
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seventy-seven percent of voters opposing the plan.263 It is, however,
difficult to know whether the resounding failure of the Swiss proposal
was a result of deep-seated opposition to a UBI in principle, or whether
it was a response to the particulars of the plan in question, which would
have guaranteed all adults a monthly income of 2,500 Swiss francs.
(The Swiss franc to U.S. dollar ratio is approximately one to one.) One
might also question the external validity of the Swiss result: the fact
that a UBI proposal failed in a landlocked mountain republic of eight
million people does not dictate its fate in the United States (although it
is certainly not a good sign). Moreover, several surveys in other
countries show much stronger backing for a basic income, with more
than half of respondents supporting the idea of a UBI in pan-European
and Canadian polls.264
Indeed, as noted at the outset, President Nixon’s Family Assistance
Plan passed the House of Representatives a half-century ago by an
overwhelming margin, with roughly proportionate support from each
party. In an alternate universe not that many million light-years from
our own, the United States might have a UBI. The failure of the Family
Assistance Plan was historically contingent: but for Watergate,
President Nixon might well have had the political capital to make the
plan a reality.265 To say that a UBI is impossible is, in our view, to
over-interpret a sequence of quasi-random events.
There are, to be sure, significant (though not necessarily
insuperable) political hurdles facing a UBI. Perhaps most importantly,
the UBI’s efficiency might be its political Achilles’ heel. Durable
transfer programs create their own constituencies. Tax preparers such
as H&R Block, Jackson Hewitt, and Liberty Tax profit from the Earned
Income Tax Credit.266 Large financial institutions such as Wells Fargo
are major players in the Low Income Housing Tax Credit market.267

263. See Switzerland’s Voters Reject Basic Income, BBC NEWS (June 5, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36454060 [https://perma.cc/NV7R-7M4Z].
264. Several polls in other countries show stronger support for a UBI. See
Stanislas Jourdan, Europe: 64% of People in Favour of Basic Income, Poll Finds,
BASIC INCOME NEWS (May 22, 2016), http://basicincome.org/news/2016/05/europe-eupoll-basic-income-support [https://perma.cc/M85R-PMPA]; Kate McFarland, Canada:
Majority Support Guaranteed Income in Angus Reid Poll, BASIC INCOME NEWS (Aug.
16, 2016), http://basicincome.org/news/2016/08/canada-majority-support-guaranteedincome-angus-reid-poll [https://perma.cc/Y3AN-XRKW].
265. See text surrounding notes 18–30.
266. See Benjamin Elgin, A Boom for Tax Prep, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2009),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2009-04-01/a-boom-for-tax-prep
[https://perma.cc/BF7H-JE2V].
267. See Donna Kimura, Wells Fargo Named Top Affordable Housing Investor,
AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
FIN.
(Mar.
2,
2017),
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Hospital industry groups lobby hard for the expansion of Medicaid.268
Redistribution is easier to accomplish when well-organized interest
groups can be enlisted as supporters. The political problem facing a
UBI is that there are few rents to be had. The more direct the transfer,
the less likely it is that any interest group other than the transferees
themselves will benefit from the transfer program. And an
unconditional cash grant is the most direct transfer there is.
Perhaps the lesson to be learned is that supporters of a UBI should
add a measure of complexity to the scheme so that recipients need the
help of H&R Block in order to claim their basic income—and so that
H&R Block, therefore, has an incentive to lobby in favor of a UBI. We
are not quite cynical enough to suggest that as a serious proposal
though. “Low-rent” redistributive programs may be politically difficult
to implement and maintain, but they are not impossible. Social Security
is probably the best example of a transfer program that does not
redound to the benefit of any obvious interest group except the intended
transferees, and Social Security is the largest transfer program we
have.269
Moreover, while the pieces of a winning UBI coalition are not yet
in place, it is still possible to imagine how the pieces might be
assembled. On the left end of the coalition is the Bernie Sanders wing
of the Democratic Party, which sees a UBI as a redistributive transfer
scheme that can bring an end to extreme poverty in the United States.270
Closer to the ideological center are technocratic think-tankers in the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan mold who see a UBI as an efficient and
empirically validated policy innovation.271 Our argument here is that
right-libertarians should be part of that coalition too. We are not so
presumptuous as to believe that our analysis here will convince all
right-libertarians. But our analysis does lead us to think that individuals
committed to libertarian principles will find that those principles point
http://www.housingfinance.com/finance/wells-fargo-named-top-affordable-housinginvestor_o [https://perma.cc/CTF9-6TG4].
268. See Michael Ollove, Hospitals Lobby Hard for Medicaid Expansion,
STATELINE
(Apr.
17,
2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2013/04/17/hospitals-lobby-hard-for-medicaid-expansion
[https://perma.cc/V5Y5-9TGG].
269. See Jeffrey B. Liebman, Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security
System, in THE DISTRIBUTIONAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL SECURITY
REFORM 11, 11 (Martin Felstein & Jeffrey B. Liebman eds., 2002).
270. See Ezra Klein, Bernie Sanders: The Vox Conversation, VOX (July 28,
2015),
http://www.vox.com/2015/7/28/9014491/bernie-sanders-vox-conversation
[https://perma.cc/M6D6-DSQJ] (quoting Sanders as saying he is “absolutely
sympathetic” to a UBI).
271. See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED
INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN (1973).
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them toward supporting some amount of redistribution that comes in
cash, without conditions, and periodically.
B. Universal Basic Income as a Concession to Political Economy
The previous section considered whether a UBI is politically
possible; we suggested that the political path to a UBI is not easy but
the barriers are not insuperable. In this respect, our analysis contrasts
with the arguments of libertarian UBI supporters such as Charles
Murray who endorse a UBI precisely because they think that it is
politically possible. Murray states the case succinctly: “The libertarian
solution is to prevent the government from redistributing in the first
place. . . . But that is a solution that upward of 90 percent of the
population will dismiss.” To Murray and others in the second-best
camp, a UBI is the least-worst form of redistribution in a world in
which redistribution is inevitable.272
We think that this pragmatic libertarian case for a UBI is
vulnerable to two major criticisms. The first, emphasized above, is that
the “libertarian solution” does not necessarily entail a flat-out
prohibition on redistribution. The second is that the existence of a UBI
may affect not only the form but also the quantity of redistribution. If
we are wrong that the libertarian first-best involves no redistribution,
then presumably libertarians should prefer less redistribution to more.
But redistribution through a UBI may be stickier than redistribution
through other mechanisms, in which case a UBI may be most-worst
rather than least-worst from a libertarian point of view. Murray himself
anticipates this critique and proposes that a UBI be coupled with a
constitutional amendment limiting future increases in cash-based or inkind redistribution.273
We do not here address the likelihood of such an amendment.
Without one, however, the pragmatic libertarian case for a UBI runs
into a practical difficulty. A democratic polity reevaluates policy
choices continuously. Whether it increases or reduces the amount of
redistribution will depend on the popularity of redistribution, which in
turn will depend on the form that redistribution takes. And herein lies
the problem for libertarians who embrace a UBI as a second-best. We
agree that a UBI is likely to be more efficient than the existing system
of means-tested in-kind transfers. That in itself might make
redistribution more popular. So too, the universality of a UBI means
that everyone can feel like a beneficiary (even if they are net transferors
rather than net transferees). This is the story of Social Security: in one
272.
273.

See MURRAY, supra note 4, at 3.
See MURRAY, supra note 4, at 7.
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recent survey, nearly three-quarters of Americans agreed with the
statement: “I don’t mind paying Social Security taxes because I know
that I will be receiving benefits when I retire.”274 We might anticipate
similar attitudes toward a UBI if all Americans receive a check.
If one thinks that some amount of redistribution is desirable, then
the potential popularity of redistribution through a UBI is of little
concern. If one aspires to a future in which there is no redistribution,
then the calculus is more complicated. Murray is probably right that a
zero-redistribution scenario is implausible, but a reduced-redistribution
scenario is not. The amount of redistribution in the United States ebbs
and flows—falling in the 1990s with welfare reform, rising in the early
2010s with the Affordable Care Act. Even if most Americans will
support redistribution regardless of whether we have a UBI, how much
redistribution they will support is not set in stone.
To be sure, our premise that redistribution would be stickier under
a UBI is speculative. One counterargument—which might follow from
our analysis in the previous section—is that the UBI’s efficiency might
make it unstable politically: since there are few rents to be had, there
will not be a well-organized interest group fighting tooth and nail to
preserve the program. Moreover, the de-linkage of payments from
work may make a UBI less popular than programs such as Social
Security that tie benefits to work history. And the pragmatic libertarian
proponent of a UBI might concede that the policy will make
redistribution stickier while also arguing that the advantages of a UBI
over the status quo overwhelm the quantity effect. Our point here is
simply that the pragmatic libertarian case for a UBI—that it is the leastworst form of redistribution—remains uneasy as long as one maintains
that zero redistribution is the ideal. But of course, if we are right that
libertarianism can countenance some amount of redistribution, then the
fact that a UBI might make redistribution stickier is no longer a
problem.
CONCLUSION
We have thus far argued that some amount of redistribution is
consistent with (and perhaps required by) minimal state libertarianism
and classical liberalism. We have also sought to explain why such
redistribution should probably be unconditional, in cash rather than inkind, and periodic rather than lump sum. We have also tried to translate
these theoretical arguments into specific claims about the sort of
universal basic income a libertarian might support. Yet not all readers
274. ELISA WALKER ET AL., NAT’L ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE,
AMERICANS MAKE HARD CHOICES ON SOCIAL SECURITY 8 tbl.2 (2014).
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(and indeed, not all of the authors of this Article) are libertarians
through and through. What can and should non-libertarians take away
from the analysis above?
We hope, at the very least, that our discussion of libertarianism
and redistribution, in addition to making some libertarian readers more
amenable to redistributionist claims, leaves non-libertarian readers with
a richer understanding of the range of attitudes toward redistribution in
libertarian quarters. Moreover, our arguments for the superiority of
cash transfers on efficiency and autonomy grounds (and our
acknowledgment of the strongest arguments for transfers in-kind)
should resonate with non-libertarian as well as libertarian ears. Our
concern that conditional cash transfers will screen out precisely the
sorts of people who need those transfers the most is, we anticipate, a
concern that libertarians and non-libertarians will share. And our novel
analysis of periodic payments versus lump sum grants is not specific to
libertarianism. While we have highlighted the reasons why libertarians
should support periodic payments, we expect that some non-libertarians
who favor redistribution from the long-lived to the short-lived will read
our treatment of the subject and conclude that lump sum transfers are
preferable on the same luck egalitarian grounds that libertarians
generally reject.
Furthermore, the common objections that we canvas—that
recipients will waste cash grants, that a UBI will discourage work, and
that a UBI will cost too much—are all critiques that many nonlibertarians will level. And the design details we discuss—the inclusion
of children and noncitizens, the size of the grant, the elimination of
other programs, and the possible phase out of benefits—are details that
any UBI must confront, regardless of whether it is justified on
libertarian or non-libertarian grounds. Finally, our discussion of the
political economy challenges facing UBI supporters applies to everyone
seeking a fundamental transformation of the existing welfare state.
Our analysis of the libertarian foundations for a basic income has
left us less perplexed by the UBI’s popularity among libertarian
thinkers—and more convinced that a UBI can be a libertarian
destination rather than a waystation. But for that to happen, and for a
UBI to become a reality, many political mountains must be moved.
Ultimately, any successful pro-UBI coalition will need to encompass
individuals with diverse philosophical commitments. We believe that
committed libertarians ought to be part of that coalition, and nonlibertarians ought to embrace them with open arms.

